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Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine 
KEVJN McMuNIGAL* 
Dissatisfaction with the subject of attorney conflict of interest appears to 
be widespread. A leading scholar reports that much of attorney conflict of 
interest doctrine is "arcane, a subspecialty whose interpretation can seem 
as abstruse as explicating the Dead Sea Scrolls. "1 A recent treatise in­
troduces the subject with the assessment that attorney conflict of interest 
problems "are not only pervasive, but intractable. "2 Such sentiments are 
not uncommon. Indeed, the regularity and frequency with which words 
such as "arcane, " "abstruse, " "intractable, " "difficult, "3 "troublesome, "4 
"confusion "5 and "morass"6 occur in reference to attorney conflict of inter­
est suggest widely felt frustration with current treatment of the subject. 7 
The subject of attorney conflict of interest in recent years has "dramati­
cally increased in importance and in the frequency with which it is liti­
gated. "8 It has been described as presenting "the most litigated questions 
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I .  Stephen Gi llers, Conflicts: Risky New Rules, AM. LAW., Sept. 1 989, at 39. 
2. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD. JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON 
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT§ 1 .7: 1 0 1 ,  at 2 1 7  (2d ed. Supp. 1 99 1 )  ("Some of the 
most difficult problems in the law of lawyering are problems of conflict of interest. These problems are 
not only pervasive, but intractable; many of them can at best be ameliorated - not 'solved. '  "). 
3 .  See id. 
4. See l. RAY PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY§ 4.0 1 ,  at 4-
( 1 982) ("The lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest in the representation of a client is one of the 
most troublesome for the profession."). 
5. See Nancy J. Moore, C01if/icts of Interest in the Simultaneous Represemation of Multiple Cli­
e/1/s: A Proposed Solution to  the Current Confusion and Controversy, 6 1  TEX. L. REv. 2 1 1 , 2 1 2  ( 1 982) 
("One of the most ferti le sources of confusion has been the rules dealing with multiple representation of 
clients with conflicting interests:"). 
6. See Robert P .  Lawry, ThJ Meaning of Loyalty, 1 9  CAP. U.  L. REv. 1 089, 1 090 ( 1 990) ( referring 
to "the present morass of the rules surrounding conflict of interest issues"). 
7 .  For other expressions of dissatisfaction with current conflict of interest doctrine, see, e.g., 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 1 94 ( 1 990) (describing the Model Code 
and Model Rules conflict of interest provisions as using "confusing language and multiple standards of 
what constitutes a conflict of interest"); MARC I. STEINBERG & TIMOTHY U. SHARPE, Attorney Con­
flicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv . I, 2 ( 1 990) ("[T)he 
rules of professional ethics and decisions in [the conflict of interest) area are far from acceptable. ' ') .  
8 .  Charles W.  Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, I GEo. J. 
LEGAL ETHIC'S 1 95 ,  207 ( 1 987).  
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of professional responsibility"9 and as a subject which has grown "enor­
mously, geometrically, exponentially." 1 0  Lawyers encounter conflict of in­
terest problems in every area of practice1 1 and face the possibility of profes­
sional discipline, 1 2 disqualification, 1 3  civil damages1 4 or loss or reduction of 
fees1 5  if they violate conflict of interest rules. The monetary consequences 
of violating conflict of interest rules have been dramatically illustrated by 
multi-million dollar judgments and settlements. 1 6  G iven the pervasiveness 
and potential consequences of conflict of interest questions, one would ex­
pect the "arcane " and "intractable " nature of conflict of interest issues to 
cause concern among lawyers today. In fact, leading ethics consultants re­
port conflict of interest as the subject about which lawyers most frequently 
9. Andrew L. Kaufman, Introduction: A Professional Agenda, 6 H oFSTRA L. REv. 6 I 9, 625 ( 1 978) .  
1 0. See Chris Goodrich, Ethics Business, CAL LAw.,  July 1 99 1 ,  at 36, 37 (quoting Judge Simon H. 
Rifkind as stating that " [w]ith the growth of the s ize of law firms, the problem of conflict [of interest) 
has grown enormously, geometrically, exponentially. The possibility that lawyers will cross wires is 
almost inevitable."). 
I I. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7 . 1 . 1 ,  at 3 1 3  ( 1 986) ("Conflict of interest 
problems are probably the most pervasively felt of all the problems of professional responsibility that 
might haunt lawyers."). 
1 2. See, e.g., In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1 979) (upholding reprimand for a lawyer charged 
with conflict of interest arising out of transaction involving small, closely held corporation, its stock­
holders and a third party); In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1 076 (N.J.  I 978) (reprimanding an attorney for 
concurrently representing buyer and seller in  purchase of low and moderate income housing units). 
I 3 .  See,· e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco I nc., 646 F.2d I 339 (9th Cir. 1 98 1 )  (upholding 
denial of motion to disqualify law firm for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility); 
Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (I st Cir. 1 987) (finding failure to disqualify counsel because of 
conflict of interest to be abuse of discretion) .  
1 4. See, e.g., Ishmael v. Mill ington, 50 Cal .  Rptr. 592 (Cal .  Dist .  Ct. App.  1 966) (acknowledging 
conflict of interest as possible basis for malpractice action and reversing grant of summary judgment 
because of existence of disputed issues of fact); W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Malpractice: Liability of 
Attomey Representing Conflicting Interests, 28 A.L.R. 3d 389, 39 1 -92  ( 1 969) .  For a discussion of the 
applicability of the ethics provisions on conflict of interest in  a civil suit for damages, sec Charles C. 
Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litiga­
tion, 30 SC L REv. 28 1 ,  304-07 ( 1 979) .  
1 5 . Financial General Bankshares, I nc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 762-63 (D.D.C. 1 98 1 )  (refer­
ring to the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility to determine whether breach 
of common law duty of fiduciary and ethical obligations has occurred), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 
680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1 982) .  
1 6. Kirk Victor, Venable Agrees to $27M Accord, NAT'L L.J, May 25, 1 987, at 3 (reporting $27 
million settlement by the Baltimore firm of Venable, Baetjer and Howard of case alleging conflict of 
interest violations in simultaneously representing the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation 
(MSSIC) and Old Court Savings and Loan,  a financial institution regulated by the MSSIC.) The 
article reports the settlement as "believed to be the country's second largest malpractice settlement." 
/d.; Stephen J .  Adler, Texas Law Firm Agrees to Pay Widow $4.3 Million After Suit for Malpractice, 
WALL ST . .1, May 1 7, 1 988, at 6 (reporting ( I) $24.4 million jury verdict, reduced by trial judge to 
$ 1 6.7 million, against a law firm based in part on allegations of conflict of interest relating to the firm's 
drafting of a will that permitted one of the firm's lawyers to act as executor and the executor to hire his 
own firm to perform the estate's legal work and (2) that the case was settled on appeal for $4.3 
million) .  
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seek their advice. 1 7  
This article focuses on conflict of interest doctrine dealing with concur­
rent conflict of interest issues. 1 8 Its thesis is that a primary source of confu­
sion in conflict of interest doctrine is its failure to clearly articulate and 
answer the central questions which lie at the heart of the subject. In es­
sence it argues that to remedy this confusion we need to rethink attorney 
conflict of interest doctrine so that it focuses more clearly on articulating 
and answering these central questions. 
Part I briefly examines the types of questions we normally label "conflict 
of interest" and concludes that the common element which brings such 
questions within this doctrinal niche is concern with the existence of incen­
tives which threaten to impair the effective and ethical functioning of a 
lawyer. It concludes that the primary task of conflict of interest doctrine is 
to formulate an appropriate response to situations which threaten impair­
ment of an attorney's functioning. 
Part II examines possible responses to situations which pose such threats. 
It concludes that a fundamental ambiguity in conflicts doctrine is its uncer­
tainty about what approach to adopt in formulating this response. It con­
cludes that three different approaches compete for expression in current 
conflicts doctrine. A risk avoidance approach conveys the message that the 
boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct is determined by 
the degree of risk presented. A resulting impairment approach conveys the 
message that the boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct 
is the point at which the attorney's functioning is either actually impaired 
or certain to be impaired. An appearance approach conveys the message 
that the boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct is deter­
mined by reference to the appearance of some impropriety. The conceptual 
dissonance created as each of these approaches competes for expression is a 
primary source of confusion in attorney conflict of interest doctrine. Part II 
argues that in order to bring structure and clarity to the amorphous area of 
conflict of interest we must clearly articulate and distinguish these compet­
ing approaches. 
"' 
17. Goodrich, supra note 1 0, at 37 (reporting that Monroe Freedman, Stephen GiBers and Geoffrey 
Hazard agree that in their role as ethics consultants "lawyers most often ask them about contlicts of 
interest, especially whether a lawyer or firm can be disqualified from an ongoing case"); cf Richard A. 
Zitrin, Allorney. Heal Thyself, CAL. LAW., July I 991, at 38 ("Some ethics experts engage in . . .  casc­
spccil1c and interactive consultation, particularly in emergency situations. Conflict of interest crises are 
the most frequent . . . .  ") . 
1 8 . This Article does not directly address conflict of interest doctrine dealing with successive conllict 
of interest issues. For economy of expression, the phrase "conllict of interest doctrine" is used in this 
Article to refer to conllict of interest doctrine dealing with concurrent conflicts. On the distinction 
between concurrent and successive conflict of interest, see STEPHEN G!Lt.ERS & NoRMAN DoRSEN, 
RECil:!.ATIO!'J OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS, Chapters XI- XII (2d ed. 1989). 
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Part III examines in detail the risk avoidance approach. It concludes 
that another primary source of confusion in conflicts doctrine is the failure 
of the risk avoidance approach to fully develop the analytical components 
required for risk analysis. Part III lays out the essential risk analysis ques­
tions which must be asked and answered in order to resolve conflict of in­
terest problems from the risk avoidance perspective. Its premise is that the 
basic task of the risk avoidance approach is one of judgment about risk of 
lawyer impairment. In exercising this judgment, one needs to analyze the 
risk presented by asking a series of fundamental questions: What facets of 
the lawyer's function should conflict of interest doctrine protect? What 
risks to those facets should it define as acceptable? Should it tolerate any 
risk? If so, how much risk is acceptable? Should conflict of interest doc• 
trine tolerate greater risk if there are good reasons for taking the risk? In 
other words, should the acceptability of the risk be a function of both the 
magnitude and the justifiability of the risk? If so, what factors should con­
flict of interest doctrine take into account in assessing the justifiability of 
the risk? Finally, who should decide what risks are acceptable? Should we 
defer to client preferences regarding trade-offs between magnitude and jus­
tifiability of risk? Or should we override client preference in order to pro­
tect or advance the interests of the client, the interests of lawyers or third 
parties or broader societal interests? Who should be charged with this au­
thority to override? The lawyer? The trial judge in a litigated case? Part 
III argues that current doctrine does a poor job of articulating and answer­
ing these questions. 
How the questions raised in Parts II and III should finally be answered 
is beyond the scope of this article. Although clearly articulating the central 
questions which lie at the heart of conflict of interest should remove a good 
deal of the confusion in attorney conflict of interest doctrine, it is only a 
beginning. Part IV discusses difficulties which remain once we have accom­
plished this task. 
I. TH E  COMMON ELEMENT IN C O N FLICT OF INTEREST: 
THREAT OF lMPAIRMEI\'T 
A. THE CONTEXTUAL I NCLI NATION 
One encounters a powerful impulse in the field of attorney conflict of 
interest to compartmentalize the subject into categories keyed to specific 
factual contexts. 1 9 Such a contextual inclination is seen in parts of the 
1 9. Similar tendencies are found in many areas of law. Oliver Wendell Holmes illustrated a ten­
dency akin to the contextualist inclination with the story of "a Vermont justice of the peace before 
whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another for breaking a churn. The justice took time to 
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Model Code and Model Rules which utilize a number of conflict of inter­
est rules applicable only to certain narrowly prescribed factual situations, 
such as lawyer media rights transactions,2° lawyers appearing as witnesses2 1  
or lawyer-client business dealsY Courts and ethics committees have cre­
ated other context-specific rules not found in the Model Code or Model 
Rules, such as the rule found in some jurisdictions against joint representa­
tion of both buyer and seller during negotiation of a real estate agreement 
of sale. 23 Professional Responsibility texts and treatises, as well as articles 
dealing with conflict of interest, frequently organize treatment of conflict of 
interest by headings keyed to factual context.24 And articles focusing exclu­
sively on conflict of interest questions limited to narrow factual settings, 
such as joint representation of criminal defendants, are a common feature 
of the academic literature on attorney conflict of interest.25 At times, a 
consider, and then said that he had looked through the statutes and could find nothing about churns, 
and gave judgment for the defendant." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1 0  H ARV. L. REv. 457, 
474-75 ( 1 897) .  Holmes commented on the pervasiveness of this "state of mind," found in legal digests 
and textbooks, which analyzes and catalogues cases according to individual factual idiosyncrasies rather 
than legal principles which transcend the factual context of a particular case. This approach results in 
cases being "tucked away under the head of Railroads or Telegraphs" rather than under the governing 
legal rules. !d. at 475 .  Holmes urged a more universalist approach, looking beyond the factual idiosyn­
crasies of particular cases to discern the rule which provides the basis for prophesying the resolution of 
future cases. !d. 
20. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule J.8(d) ( 1 99 1 )  (hereinafter MODEL RULES] ;  
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5- 1 04(B) ( 1 983)  [hereinafter MODEL CODE] .  
2 1 .  MoDEL RuLES Rule 3 .7 ;  MODEL CoDE DR 5- 1 02. 
22. MODEL RULES Rule 1 .8{a); MODEL CODE DR 5- 1 04(A). 
23.  See, e.g., New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 243, 95 N.J.L.J. 1 1 45 
( 1 972) (in a real estate transaction "in all circumstances it is unethical for the same attorney to re­
present buyer and seller in negotiating the terms of a contract of sale"); see also Moore, supra note 5, 
at 224-225 ("Most attempts to guide practitioners merely set forth guidelines to govern specific situa­
tions in which multiple representation is common." !d. at 224. "Specific guidelines can be found in 
litigated court cases, in advisory ethical opinions addressed both to individual and categories of cases, 
and in professional commentaries which confine themselves to particular situations . . .  Unfortunately, 
most commentaries which purport to give more general guidance usually end up merely summarizing 
what courts and ethics committees are actually doing in narrow categories of cases." !d. at 224 n.62 
(emphasis added) .  As examples of such guidelines tailored to "specific situations," Professor Moore 
cites In re Farr, 340 N .E:2d 777 (Ind. 1 976) (representation of host-driver and guest-passenger in 
action against other driven)i'; Ohio B. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 30, reprinted in [ 1973] I FAM.  L. REP. 
(BNA) No. 34 AT 3 1 1 0  (JULY 1 5, 1 975) (standards for representation of spouses in no-fault divorce); 
John Stewart Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the 
Professional Responsibilities of the Defense A ttorney, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1 1 9, at 1 57-62 ( 1 978) (dis­
cussing the ethical propriety of representing criminal codefendants); D. Kent Meyers, Ethical Consid­
erations in the Representation of Multiple Creditors Against a Single Debtor, 5 1  AM. BANKR. L.J. 19, 
26-30 ( 1 977) (representing multiple parties in bankruptcy actions);  Note, Simultaneous Representa­
tion: Transaction Resolution in the Adversary System, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 86, 94- 1 1 6  ( 1 977) 
(uncontested divorce, formation of close corporation and sale of real estate); Moore, supra note 5, at 
224 n.62). 
24. See, e.g., Robert H.  Aronson, Conflict of !merest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807 ( 1 977).  
25.  See, e.g., Gary T. Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 
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particular factual context, such as joint representation in criminal cases, is 
further subdivided into even smaller niches, such as joint representation of 
witnesses appearing before a grand jury and joint representation of charged 
criminal defendants. The contextual inclination reflects the attitude that 
each particular context presents conflict' of interest problems which are 
unique.26 
A contextual approach to attorney conflict of interest issues has much to 
recommend it. Dividing any complicated subject makes pragmatic sense in 
attempting to conquer it. Partitioning the seemingly limitless variety of at­
torney conflict of interest problems renders them more manageable, and 
one way to partition them is by factual context. The contextual approach 
may aid in developing rules which are sensitive to the nuances and needs of 
particular factual settings, such as divorce or joint criminal representation. 
In addition, compartmentalization by factual context may facilitate com­
parison of cases within a particular context and thus promote consistency 
of treatment within that particular context. 
Despite its appeal, and perhaps in part because of it, the contextual incli­
nation has its dangers. In the broad landscape of conflicts doctrine, it may 
produce what appears from a panoramic perspective to be a patchwork 
with little consistency from one factual setting to another and no discern­
ible relationship to any larger view about how conflict of interest should be 
handledY In other words, while a contextual approach may promote con­
sistency within a particular factual setting, it runs the risk of reducing con­
sistency between different contexts and of undermining the development of 
a clear larger picture. Energy and attention may become so focused on 
questions arising in particular contexts that treatment of the common ele­
ments which all conflict of interest questions present may be given short 
shrift. Treating the rules for each context as sui generis may distract and 
discourage one from developing a consistent and uniform general approach 
to conflict of interest problems. A leading treatise states that: 
[C]onflict of interest problems are pervasive in law practice and can arise 
early, late, and at intermediate points throughout a representation in a 
VA. L REv. 939 ( 1978);  Geer, supra note 23. 
26. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 24, at 808-09 ("Within each area of the law and form of legal 
practice the conflict of interest problems are unique, calling for individualized and imaginative 
treatment.") .  
27. See Murray L .  Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL L REv. 
669, 670 ( 1978)  ("The lack of definite answers to professional questions can in large part be explained 
by the absence of a general, coherent theory of professional behavior for lawyers . . .  One consequence 
of the absence of any general theory is that lawyers often respond to professional problems in ad hoc, 
pragmatic ways, redclining the issues to avoid reaching the ethical question. Such an approach, while 
not manifestly illegitimate, is a very limited and intellectually unsatisfactory way of responding to 
professional problems.") .  
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bewildering variety of shapes and sizes. One should not, therefore, press 
too hard the question of general standards in a search for underlying 
ordering principles. 28 
829 
This article takes the position that. we have not pressed hard enough the 
question of "general standards" and the "search for underlying ordering 
principles" in the area of conflict of interest. It seeks to facilitate the devel­
opment of a broader perspective to balance conflict of interest doctrine's 
predilection to contextualism. Its purpose is not to displace the contextual 
approach but rather to balance it. The problem is not so much with the 
contextual approach itself but rather that we have ignored simultaneously 
developing a more universal framework within which to fit particular ad 
hoc rules. It may be wise to maintain or even to increase our reliance upon 
context specific rules. Nonetheless, we need a universal vocabulary and 
framework within which to fit contextual rules. 
As the prior paragraphs make clear, one of the dangers of contextual 
thinking is that it may keep us from discerning the elements which are 
common to all conflict of interest problems. A necessary first step in devel­
oping a clear and structured approach to a problem is to understand the 
nature of the problem. It is to this topic that we next turn. 
B. THE COMMON E LEMENT I N  CONFLICT OF I NTEREST 
Questions involving attorney conflict of interest vary in apparent form 
and arise in widely disparate factual settings. Indeed, it is this feature of 
variability which makes conflict of interest lend itself readily to a contex­
tual approach. Consider, for example, the following motley assortment of 
attorney conflict of interest issues. May a prosecutor sell the media rights 
to portrayal of her character in a highly publicized case?29 Is it permissible 
for a defendant in a civil rights case to propose a settlement offer condi­
tioned on the plaintiff's waiver of attorney's fees?30 May a single lawyer 
represent both husband and wife in a divorce,31 the buyer and seller m a 
28. WOLFRAM, supra nott7 I I, § 7. 1 .3, at 3 1 6  (emphasis added). 
29. See N.Y. State Bar AtiSs'n Op. 606, 2 1 -89 (Nov. I, 1 990). (Upon completion of a criminal prose­
cution, assistant district attorney may sell her media rights and participate in the development of her 
character in a screenplay or other literary medium, so long as client's confidential information is not 
revealed.) 
30. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U .S. 7 1 7  ( 1 986).  (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1 976 
interpreted as not generally prohibiting settlements conditioned on waiver of plainti ff's attorney's fees. 
/d. at 737-38) .  Cf Bar Ass'n of the City of N.Y.  Op. 80-94 ( 1 980) (stating that it is unethical for a 
defendant to make an offer of settlement in "public interest" cases conditioned on waiver of plaintiff's 
attorney's fees) (Withdrawn after Evans opinion. Bar Ass'n of the City of N.Y. Op. 87-4 ( 1 987) ) .  
31.  See Levine v .  Levine, 436 N.E.2d 476 (N.Y. 1 982) (holding that the joint representation of a 
husband and wife in a separation proceeding by a single attorney is insufficient alone to require rescis­
sion of the agreement). 
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residential real estate transaction32 or companies which are business com­
petitors? 33 Should sexual involvement with a client,34 the spouse of a cli­
ent35 or opposing counseP6 preclude the lawyer from representing the cli­
ent? If a lawyer represents a brokerage firm under investigation for 
securities fraud, may he simultaneously represent an individual employee 
of the firm appearing before the grand jury which has targeted the em­
ployee as a source of information about the firm's alleged wrongdoing?37 If 
a lawyer is herself under criminal investigation and cooperating with inves­
tigating authorities, may she represent clients in criminal matters?38 Must 
a law firm remove a lawyer from a case because the lawyer's race, sex, 
religion or ethnic background is likely to arouse the prejudice of a particu­
lar judge or jury?39  
What do attorney media rights transactions have in common with settle­
ment offers conditioned on fee waivers, the sexual relations of lawyers, or 
joint representation of a company and one of its employees during the in­
vestigatory phase of a criminal proceeding? A contextualist might well an­
swer that these questions are more dissimilar than they are alike, empha-
32. See In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1 974) (holding that an attorney merits reprimand for 
representing both vendor and purchaser without fully advising the parties of areas of potential conflict 
and for failing to withdraw when conflict arose). 
33. See Curtis v. Radio Representatives, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 729, 734-37 (D.  D.C. 1 988) (holding that 
no violation of conflict of interest rules exists in the simultaneous representation of business 
competitors). 
34. See United States v. Babbitt, 26 M.J.  1 57 (C.M.A. 1 988) ;  In re McDow, 354 S.E.2d 383 
( 1 987);  Cal. Formal Op. 1 987-92; AI. Op. 88-0 1 ( 1 988) .  California has recently considered enacting 
the first absolute ban in the United States on lawyer-client sexual relations. See Philip Hager, Lawyer­
Clielll Sex May Be Banned by State Bar, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  at A3, col. 5. For a discussion of 
the issue of sexual relations between lawyer and client in the context of divorce representation, see 
Lawrence Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits, 1 GEO . J. LEGAL ETHICS 585 
( 1 988) .  
35. See People v. Singer, 275 Cal.  Rptr .  9 1 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 990) (holding that defendant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel was violated by conflict of interest arising from undisclosed affair be­
tween defense counsel and defendant's wife). 
36. See People v. Jackson, 2 1 3  Cal. Rptr. 5 2 1  (Cal. Ct. App. 1 985)  (holding that a defendant's right 
to effective assistance of counsel was violated by conflict of interest arising from undisclosed "sustained 
dating relationship" between defense counsel and prosecutor). 
37. See Laurie P. Cohen, Issue of Lawyer's Loyalty is Raised by Drexel Employee's Conviction, 
WALL ST. J., March 24, 1 989 ,  at B3. 
38. See United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1 990) (holding that the fact that defense 
counsel was under investigation before and during defendant's trial for crimes unrelated to the crimes 
with which the defendant was charged did not constitute a sufficient conflict of interest to result in a 
per se violation of defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. McCloy, 574 
A.2d 86 (Pa. Super. 1 990) (holding that the fact that defense counsel was cooperating in an FBI 
investigation unrelated to the charges against the defendant did not constitute a sufficient conflict of 
interest to amount to a violation of defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel) ; United States v. 
Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1 984) (reversing criminal conviction on the grounds that trial counsel 
may have engaged in criminal conduct related to the conduct for which the defendant was on trial). 
39. See GILLERS & DoRSEN, supra note 1 8 , at 6 1 3- 1 5  (simulated case history). 
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sizing the considerable variations in the factual contexts of each of these 
questions. Despite wide variations in form and context, however, the com­
mon feature which brings each of these questions within the doctrinal niche 
labeled "conflict of interest" is concern with the existence of some particu­
lar incentive which threatens the effective and ethical functioning of a 
lawyer. 
Take, for example, the question whether a prosecutor should be permit­
ted to sell the media rights to portrayal of her character.40 Allowing such a 
sale creates a financial incentive for the prosecutor to increase the value of 
those rights in order to advance her own economic self-interest. This finan­
cial incentive puts at risk a number of different facets of the prosecutor's 
professional functioning, since many of the prosecutor's decisions and ac­
tions affect the value of her media rights. 
The prosecutor's initial exercise of prosecutorial discretion whether or 
not to prosecute the case, for example, is threatened since a decision not to 
prosecute would in most instances reduce the value of the prosecutor's me­
dia rights. As the portrayal of lawyers in popular media makes clear, a 
trial makes for more interesting and dramatic media fare than a guilty 
plea,41 raising concern that the prosecutor's decision whether and on what 
terms to enter into plea negotiations with the defendant is at risk of being 
influenced by concern for media value. Similar concerns may be raised 
about the prosecutor's ethical obligations of confidentiality, public com­
ment to the press and strategic decisions such as what witnesses to call at 
trial or what matters to emphasize during closing argument. Each of these 
decisions and actions presents the prosecutor with an opportunity to yield 
to the incentive to promote her financial self-interest. 
All of the conflict of interest questions posed at the outset of this section 
raise the issue of some particular incentive which threatens to impair an 
attorney's functioning. A settlement offer in a civil rights case conditioned 
on the plaintiff's waiver of attorney's fees creates a financial incentive 
which threatens the plaintiff's lawyer's function in providing impartial ad-
40. For discussion of the issue of media rights transactions, see, e.g., Richardson R. Lynn, Restrict­
ing Attorney Speech about Mjttters of Recent Employment, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 53 1 ( 1982); Martin S.  
Goldberg, Note, Publication Rights Agreements in Sensational Criminal Cases: A Response to the 
Problem, 68 CORNELL L. R EV. 686 ( 1 983);  Jill A. Sperber, Note, Publication Rights Fee Contracts 
Between Attorneys and Criminal Defendants: Waiving the Right to Counsel, 1 7  U.S.F. L. REv. 549 
( 1983);  Keith Noel Bond, Note, Comracting for Publication Rights in Lieu of Attorney's Fees in 
Criminal Cases, 3 1  BuFF. L .  REV. 483 ( 1 982); Claire Hamner, Note, Conflict of Interests When A ttor­
neys Acquire Rights to the Client 's Life Story, 6 J. LEG. PROF. 299 ( 1 981); Bruce I. Favish, Note, 
Conflicting Interests in Lawyer-Client Publication Rights Agreemellfs-The Story of Bobby Joe Max­
well, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 869 (1981). 
4 1 .  See Kevin McMunigal, The Costs of Settlemem: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on 
Litigating Lawyers, 37  UCLA L. REv. 833 ,  834 ( 1 990) ("Images of lawyers in trial dominate popular 
media such as novels, films, and television ."). 
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vice to his client about the settlement offer.42 The fact that the settlement 
offer leaves the plaintiff's lawyer uncompensated gives the plaintiff's lawyer 
a financial incentive to advise against the settlement. Sexual involvement 
by a lawyer with the spouse of a client in a criminal case may give the 
lawyer an emotional incentive to reduce the efforts expended in defense of 
the client. Simultaneous representation of a brokerage firm and an em­
ployee of the firm during a grand jury investigation threatens the function­
ing of the lawyer providing the joint representation in a number of ways.43 
For example, if the individual employee were called before a grand jury 
seeking information about her employer's alleged wrongdoing, the fact that 
the lawyer also jointly represents the employing firm, a future source of 
business for the lawyer, creates an incentive for the lawyer not to urge the 
individual client to tell the truth to the grand jury. Such action would pro­
tect the employer but place the individual at risk of a perjury conviction.44 
Each of these questions raises the issue of threat posed to an attorney's 
functioning. In other words, these questions require one to deal with the 
issue of risk of impairment of an attorney's functioning. Factual permuta­
tions on this basic theme of threatened impairment are virtually inex:haust­
ible. The questions above suggest just a few of the possible variations. In 
some, the source of the threat is the financial or personal interest of the 
lawyer. In others, it is the interests of another client or of a third party. In 
some, the threat seems narrowly focused on a particular facet of the attor­
ney's functioning, such as performance as trial advocate or as advisor in 
connection with a grand jury appearance. In others, the risk involves multi­
ple facets of the lawyer's representation. 
Another way of describing the common element of conflict of interest is 
through the language of economics. Economists use the term "agency cost " 
to express the concern that an agent may not always act in the best inter­
ests of the principal, even though the agent is legally required to do so.45 
42. See infra Part I I I .B . I.b. 
43. For discussion of some of the problems which arise in representing multiple clients during a 
grand jury investigation, see Nancy J. Moore, Disqualification of an A ttorney Represeming Multiple 
Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. REv. I ( 1979). 
44. For a discussion of the tension between a corporation's interests and those of its employees dur-
ing a criminal investigation, see Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the 
Employee Owed More Protection Than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 INDIANA L. REV. 1 ( 1990). 
45. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen and William H .  Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav­
ior. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 ( 1976): Agency costs are typi­
cally delined to include both the costs of monitoring the agent's fidelity to his obligations as well as the 
residual losses incurred when the agent is unfaithful to his obligations. See. e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Govemance Movement, 35 YAND. L. REv.  1259, 1263 n. l l  ( 1982) ("A fi rm's agency costs 
include monitoring costs that arise from the agency relationship, as well as the agent's bonding expendi­
tures and the residual loss attributable to the divergence in i nterest between principals and agents.") .  
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The problem of agency cost is inherent in any agency relationship,46 includ­
ing that between lawyer and client. The concept of agency cost has been 
described as "essentially a formal statement of a problem that the law has 
long recognized and addressed under the heading of conflict of interest. "47 
Whatever the terminology used, the primary task of conflict of interest 
doctrine is to formulate a response to situations which pose a threat of 
impairment to an attorney's functioning. Perhaps the most fundamental 
ambiguity in conflict of interest doctrine is its uncertainty about what ap­
proach to adopt in responding to such threats, a subject examined in the 
following section. 
II. THE RESPONSE TO THREAT OF IMPAI RMENT 
Why do we need conflict of interest rules? The simple, intuitive response 
is that we need to protect the integrity of an attorney's functioning. But 
one might view a separate set of conflict of interest rules as unnecessary for 
achieving this goal. In other words, it could be argued that existing con­
straints other than conflicts rules are sufficient to check any impairment 
threat. A particular incentive giving rise to conflict of interest concerns is 
only one of a constellation of incentives and constraints which simultane­
ously exert pressure on a lawyer. A number of incentives and constraints 
reinforce the attorney's resistance to impairment pressure, helping to check 
incentives which threaten to compromise the lawyer's functioning. Sanc­
tions for violation of lawyer rules of conduct separate from the conflict of 
interest rules, such as those imposing the substantive obligations of compe­
tence and confidentiality, are available through professional discipline, civil 
liability and loss or reduction of fees if the lawyer actually provides im­
paired service. Competition in the market for legal services also provides an 
incentive for the lawyer not to accede to impairment pressure, lest he lose 
the client to another lawyer.48 One might view such incentives and con­
straints as powerful enough to keep risk of impairment from materializing 
into actual impairment. If more preventive power is needed, an adherent to 
this viewpoint would argue that we need simply to increase either the se­
verity or the cert:}inty of the sanctions for violation of the rule of conduct 
violated. A response to threats of attorney impairment based on this view 
would draw the boundary line between permissible and impermissible con­
duct at the point of actual impairment of the lawyer obligations which exist 
46. Fischel, supra note 45, at 1263 n . l  0. 
47. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEo. 
WASH. L REV. 582, 594 ( 1984). 
48. See Fischel, supra note 45, at 1263 ("The market also plays a valuable role in minimizing 
agency costs.") .  
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apart from the conflict of interest provisions. 
The very fact that conflict of interest doctrine exists demonstrates im­
plicit rejection of the view sketched above. Rather, the doctrine seems 
based on the assumption that we need something more to protect against 
threats of impairment. Its very existence seems to demonstrate a felt need 
for something more than what is offered by the position sketched above. 
Just as in criminal law the development of various inchoate crimes demon­
strates a felt need to supplement sanctions focusing on resulting harm, the 
existence of conflicts rules seems to indicate a feeling that the rules which 
define and protect various roles and obligations of lawyers aside from the 
conflict rules, are insufficient to protect against threats of attorney impair­
ment.49 Exactly what else is needed, however, has proven elusive. 
Three different conceptions of the appropriate response to incentives 
which threaten attorney impairment compete for expression in current con­
flict of interest doctrine. Each provides a distinct reference point for estab­
lishing the boundary between permissible and impermissible attorney con­
duct in conflict of interest situations. An appearance approach prohibits 
conduct which appears improper. A risk avoidance approach prohibits con­
duct which creates unacceptable risk of impairment. A resulting impair­
ment approach prohibits conduct which either results in or is certain to 
result in impairment. 
The thrust of Part I I  is that current doctrine does a poor job of utilizing 
these conceptual approaches. It fails to distinguish them clearly and to rec­
ognize their inconsistencies. Competition among these approaches results in 
conceptual confusion which is a primary source of ambiguity in current 
conflict of interest doctrine. This conceptual confusion is mirrored in the 
verbal confusion found in the terminology of conflict of interest doctrine. 
A. THE THREE COMPETING CONCEPTIONS 
In examining current doctrine's utilization of these three approaches, 
this Part begins with the resulting impairment and risk avoidance ap­
proaches and then proceeds to the appearance approach. In order to under­
stand and distinguish between the risk and resulting impairment ap­
proaches, it is critical to grasp the distinction between conduct which 
creates risk of impairment and conduct which actually results in impair­
ment. Failure to recognize this relatively simple distinction between risk 
49. Sometimes conflicts rules are justified on the ground that they are preventive in rationale. But i t  
is  important to note that the approach just sketched is ,  in fact, a preventive approach. I t  seeks to 
prevent impairment by reinforcing internal constraints with penalties for actual impairment, just as the 
criminal penalty for murder with its requirement of a resulting death may be justified on the ground of 
deterring intentional killing. 
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and result is a fundamental and pervasive problem in conflict of interest 
doctrine.50 The distinction has proved so elusive in the conflict of interest 
area that some elaboration on the distinction at this point is useful in order 
to make certain it is firmly grasped. Analogies from criminal law are help­
ful to illustrate this distinction and its implications for formulating conflict 
of interest doctrine. 
Certain crimes by definition require a particular result. A vehicular 
homicide statute punishing reckless or negligent driving which causes a 
death provides an example of this sort of crime.51 Other crimes are defined 
without reference to the occurrence of a particular result. Such crimes fo­
cus instead on risk, the tendency of the conduct in question to cause a 
particular result. A reckless driving statute punishing driving which creates 
an unacceptable level of risk provides an example of this sort of crimeY 
The question of whether and to what degree the criminal law should rely 
on risk or resulting harm in formulating criminal offenses and prescribing 
punishment has been the focal point of considerable debate. In both defin­
ing and grading offenses, the criminal law has traditionally tended to at­
tach great significance to resulting harm. Under both the common law and 
traditional American criminal codes, the incorporation of a resulting harm 
requirement was a standard feature, while prosecution of conduct which 
created risk but did not actually cause resulting harm was left to ad hoc 
statutory crimes "narrowly focused on limited classes of conduct."53 In the 
area of grading, this same philosophy was exemplified in the law of at­
tempt. Attempts have traditionally been, and in many jurisdictions still are, 
punishable at only a small fraction of the punishment assigned to com­
pleted crimes.54 
The criminal law's traditional emphasis on resulting harm has been chal­
lenged by scholars questioning why the occurrence of a particular result 
50. See infra Part I I. B. At times the distinction is clearly recognized. For a particularly clear treat­
ment of the distinction between risk and resulting impairment in attorney conflict of interest doctrine, 
see FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at  1 75. 
5 1 .  See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.07 (Baldwin 1 9 9 1 )  ("(A) No person, while operating or 
participating in the operation' of a motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or 
a ircraft, shall negligently ca'Cse the death of another. (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of 
vehicular homicide, a misdemeanor of the first degree") .  
52.  See. e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 451 1 .20 (Baldwin 1 99 1 )  ("No person shal l  operate a vehicle, 
trackless trolley, or streetcar on any street or highway in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of 
persons or property."). 
53 . Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 498 (5th ed. 
1 989) .  
54. !d. at 6 2 1 -22. ("At common law attempts were misdemeanors. Today the  usual punishment 
grading system for attempt involves making it punishable by a reduced factor of the punishment for the 
completed crime. In California (Cal. Penal Code § 664) attempt carries a maximum term of not more 
than one-half of the highest maximum term authorized for the completed offense.") 
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should affect criminal liability. Examination and debate of the issue of the 
role of resulting harm has given rise to a substantial body of scholarship.5s 
Critics of the criminal law's traditional emphasis on resulting harm argue 
that the proper focus of penal law is on risk creation rather than resulting 
harm. From both the deterrence and incapacitation points of view, conduct 
which creates undue risk is an appropriate object of criminal sanction re­
gardless of whether it happens to result in harm on a particular occasion. 
From a retributive point of view, the moral blameworthiness of a defendant 
derives from his conduct and the mental state which accompanies that con­
duct, not from the fact that harm in fact results, which often turns on some 
fortuity outside the control of the defendant.56 
What is there to learn from the criminal analogy? First, criminal law 
has achieved clarity as to when results are required and when they are not. 
In other words, we know what role resulting harm plays under a vehicular 
homicide statute and under a reckless driving statute. It is a prerequisite in 
vehicular homicide and irrelevant for reckless driving. Second� there has 
been extensive debate on the question of the role of resulting harm in crim­
inal law, a debate which has informed the evolution of substantive criminal 
law doctrine. In the area of conflict of interest, we have failed to achieve 
either one. Conflict of interest doctrine frequently is unclear about the dis-
55 .  For a discussion of attitudes favoring an emphasis on actual harm, see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 
CRIMINAL LAW-THE G ENERAL PART, § 49, at 1 36 (2d ed. 1 96 1 )  ("The only theory of punishment 
that explains the present law [punishing attempts Jess severely than the completed crime] is a crude 
retaliation theory, where the degree of punishment is linked rather to the amount of damage done than 
to the intention of the actor.");  Meir Dan Cohen, Causation, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND Jus­
TICE 1 65 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1 983) ("That the actual death of the victim is somehow relevant to 
determining the accused's criminal liability is nonetheless a widely shared and deeply entrenched intui­
tion . .  Although [this] intention itself resists rationalization by reference to the goals of criminal law, 
it can still be demonstrated that the fact of its existence and pervasiveness is relevant to the criminal 
law's ability to discharge its main functions . . . .  ") .  For a discussion of attitudes favoring an emphasis 
on risk creation, see Stephen J .  Schulhofer, Harm and Punishmelll: A Critique of Emphasis on the 
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 1 22 U. PA. L. REv. 1 497 ( 1 974). See also Herbert Wechsler, 
The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 H ARV. L REV. I 097, II 06 ( 1 952) ("From the preventive 
point of view, the harmfulness of conduct rests upon its tendency to cause the injuries to be prevented 
far more than on actual results; results, indeed, have meaning only insofar as they may indicate or 
dramatize the tendencies involved."); H .LA. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 52-53 
( 1 965) ;  SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 3 1 1  (I 883); 
Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the 
Common Law, 1 9  RuTGERS L REv . 725 ( 1 988); J.C. Smith, The Element of Chance in Criminal 
Liability, 1 97 1  C RIM.  L REv . 63,  74-75 ( 1 97 1 ) . 
56. A similar debate has recently emerged concerning the role of resulting harm in tort law. See 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L REv. 
439, 439 ( 1 990) (arguing that "corrective justice requires, as a regulative ideal, that we be held liable 
when we have increased the risk of harm occurring, whether or not i t  eventually does"); see also Ken­
neth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L REv. 
1 1 3 ( 1 990) ;  Christopher H .  Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 
UCLA L.  REV.  1 43 ( 1 990). 
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tinction between resulting impairment of a lawyer's functioning and risk of 
impairment. Nor has there been extensive debate on the roles of resulting 
impairment and risk in formulating conflict of interest doctrine. 
1. The Resulting Impairment Approach 
A pure resulting impairment approach dictates concern only with actual 
impairment of a lawyer's functioning. The idea here is to monitor the ac­
tual point of impairment, making sure no lawyer goes beyond it. Like a 
criminal statute which prohibits only conduct resulting in actual harm, this 
approach draws the boundary between permissible and impermissible con­
duct at the point where the lawyer's functioning is actually compromised. 
Just such a pure resulting impairment approach seems to be reflected in 
the attorney conflict of interest rules concerning business transactions be­
tween an attorney and a client. Such transactions pose a high risk of im­
pairing the lawyer's obligations to his client. In such transactions, the law­
yer's business interest in the transaction gives him a financial incentive to 
take advantage of his client. His professional training and access to client 
information often provide a ready means for the lawyer to yield to this 
incentive.57 In addition, due to the professional relationship, the client is 
likely to be dependent on the lawyer and assume that the lawyer is protect­
ing the client's interests, making the client particularly vulnerable.58 None­
theless, such transactions are not prohibited. Rather, the rule generally is 
that the lawyer shall not enter into such dealings with a client unless "the 
transaction and terms . . .  are fair and reasonable to the client. "59 In other 
words, the lawyer may enter into such high risk transactions as long as he 
avoids actually harming the business interests of his client. 
In addition to the basic rule that the transaction must be fair and rea­
sonable to the client, other ancillary rules triggered by attorney-client busi­
ness deals offer the client added protection. Some of these rules operate 
retrospectively. For example, courts typically closely scrutinize such trans­
actions after the fact to assure their fairness.60 Also, when such a transac­
tion is examined by a court after the fact, the burden of proof is often on 
the attorney to pr.ove that the deal was in fact fair and equitable.61 Some 
courts presume \'indue influence unless the attorney proves otherwise.62 
Other rules operate prospectively. Requirements of full disclosure63 as well 
57. GILLERS & DORSEN. supra note 1 8 , at 607. 
58. !d. 
59. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule l .8(a)( l ) . 
60. WOLFRAM, supra note I I ,  § 8 . 1 1 .3, at 48 1 -82. 
6 1 .  G ILLERS & 00RSEN, supra note I 8 , at 607. 
62. /d.; see also WoLFRAM, supra note I I ,  § 8 .  I 1 .3, at 48 I .  
63. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule l .8(a) ( I ) ; MODEL CODE D R  5- 1 04(A). 
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as independent advice64 make it easier for the client to protect his own 
business interests from being impaired by the lawyer. But despite these 
ancillary procedural protections, the final test is whether the client's busi­
ness interests are actually impaired by the lawyer. In short, the approach 
adopted in dealing with attorney-client business transactions seems to be a 
resulting impairment approach coupled with procedural safeguards to help 
in monitoring the boundary line of actual impairment. 
Joint representation of criminal defendants is another situation which 
poses high risk of impairment of a criminal defense attorney's function­
ingY Accordingly, academic commentators have urged the adoption of an 
absolute rule prohibiting such joint criminal representation.66 Such an ab­
solute rule has not generally been adopted, howeverY The United States 
Supreme Court has explicitly adopted a resulting impairment approach for 
delineating a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights in such joint 
representation situations. " [I]n order to demonstrate a violation of his 
Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."68 
A different version of the resulting impairment approach than the one 
outlined above seeks to anticipate those situations in which resulting im­
pairment is certain to occur and prevent them before the point of actual 
impairment is reached. Such an "anticipatory" resulting impairment ap­
proach maintains a focus on resulting impairment but adds a temporal 
buffer by providing a means for preempting conduct which is certain to 
result in actual impairment. 
Portions of the general conflict of interest provisions of the Model Code 
seem to reflect this anticipatory approach. D R  5- l O l (A) sets forth the pro­
hibition that a lawyer shall not accept employment if "his professional 
judgment on behalf of his client will be . . . affected by his own financial, 
business, property, or personal interests. "69 D R  5- l 05 (A) instructs that a 
lawyer must decline employment if "the exercise of his independent profes­
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be . . .  adversely affected by the 
64. See. e.g. , Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Mass. 1 975) (holding that lawyer was under 
a duty not to proceed with business deal with client "until he was satisfied that [the client] had ob­
tained independent advice on the matter"). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require only that 
the client be given "a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel i n  the transac­
tion." MODEL RULES Rule 1 .8(a)(2). 
65. For discussion of the risks entailed in joint criminal representation, see Lowenthal, supra note 
25; Geer, supra note 23 ;  Moore, supra note 5. 
66. See id. 
67. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES Rule 1 .7 cmt.; MoDEL CoDE EC 5- 1 7 . 
68.  Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S.  3 35, 350 ( 1 980). 
69. MODEL CODE DR 5- I O I (A) (emphasis added). 
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acceptance of the proffered employment . . . . "70 DR 5-l  05 (B) similarly 
instructs that a lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if "the ex­
ercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client wUI be 
. .  adversely affected by his representation of another client " 7 1  
2. The Risk Avoidance Approach 
A typical response to an allegation of attorney conflict of interest is an 
assertion by the attorney whose conduct is at issue that she either did not 
or will not alter her representation of her client in any way.n In other 
words, the attorney asserts that no actual impairment of her functioning 
either has occurred or will occur. For purposes of this article, the interest­
ing part of such a response is not the validity of the assertions about either 
past or future impairment. The attorney may in fact be able to resist 
whatever incentives pose risk in the particular situation. Rather, the inter­
esting aspect of such a response is the implicit view it reflects that conflict 
of interest requires resulting impairment. If one adopts a risk approach to 
conflict of interest, as outlined in the following paragraphs, such a response 
by a lawyer is analogous to a driver charged with reckless driving asserting 
as a defense that she did not harm anyone. Lack of resulting harm is le­
gally irrelevant to a reckless driving charge. Similarly, lack of actual im- 1 
pairment is irrelevant to conflict of interest when viewed from a risk avoid- I 
ance perspective. 
The risk avoidance approach views conflict of interest rules as a rough 
equivalent in legal ethics to crimes of risk creation in criminal law. Just as 
these criminal statutes prohibit certain unacceptable risks to persons or 
property, attorney conflict of interest rules are viewed from the risk avoid­
ance perspective as prohibiting unacceptable risks to the various roles and 
obligations of lawyers defined outside the conflict of interest rules. In short, 
the risk avoidance approach views conflict of interest rules as telling law­
yers that in addition to not actually violating the obligations set forth 
outside the conflict of interest rules, they must also avoid unacceptable 
risks of violating these obligations. 
Much of conflict o� interest doctrine reflects a risk avoidance approach. 
Indeed, it is probably the dominant theme among the three competing ap-
70. MoDEL CoDE DR 5- 1 05(A) (emphasis added) .  
7 1 .  MODEL CoDE DR 5- 1 05(B) (emphasis added) .  
72. See. e.g., Torassa & Holthaus, Prosecutor Confirms Tie to 2nd Probe Figure, CLEV.  PLAIN 
DEALER, June 30, 1 99 1 ,  at  I -A (reporting county prosecutor's friendship and political connections with 
the potential target of a grand jury welfare fraud investigation. The story reports that in  response to 
suggestions that she withdraw from active involvement in  the investigation due to conflict of interest, 
the prosecutor stated that she did not feel the need to step aside and that " [f] riendship will not impair 
the job I have to do." /d. at 4-A (emphasis added)) .  
840 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 5 : 823 
proaches. Model Code D R  5- l O l (A) sets forth the prohibition that a law­
yer shall not accept employment if "his professional judgment on behalf of 
his client . . . reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, 
property, or personal interests."73 DR 5- 1 05 (A) states that a lawyer must 
decline employment if "the exercise of his independent professional judg­
ment in behalf of a client . . .  is likely to be adversely affected by the 
acceptance of the proffered employment . . . .  "74 DR 5- 1 05 (B) requires 
that a lawyer shall not continue to represent multiple clients if "the exer­
cise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client . . .  is 
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client 
• • • .  
"75 Model Rule 1 .7 (b) instructs that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the 
lawyer's own interests . . . .  "76 These passages, with their use of "may" 
and "likely," clearly suggest a concern with avoidance of the risk of 
impairment. 
A similar risk approach is reflected in passages from cases dealing with 
attorney conflict of interest. Courts have explicitly held, for example, that 
" [l]ack of actual injury to the client or profit to the attorney is no defense 
to a fiduciary's breach of his duty of loyalty; the harm is in the attorney 
exposing himself to the potential conflict. "77 What these passages from 
both the ethics codes and case law indicate is that "[c] onflicts of interest 
can exist even though no substantive impropriety has in fact occurred . . .  
[T] he concept of conflict of interest turns upon reasonable possibility based 
upon experience and common sense."78 Just as there were variations on the 
resulting impairment approach, there are multiple variations on the risk 
approach expressing a wide range of views about how much risk is accept­
able. These variations are treated in detail in Part III .B ,  infra. 
3. The Appearance Approach 
The resulting impairment approach is concerned with harm to the law­
yer's obligation which either has in fact occurred or is certain to occur. The 
risk approach is concerned with risk of impairment which is, in fact, posed 
by a particular situation. As its name suggests, the appearance approach 
by contrast is concerned with the appearance of some impropriety. 
73.  MODEL CODE DR 5- 1 0 1 (A) (emphasis added) .  
74. MODEL CODE DR 5- l 05(A) (emphasis added) .  
75 .  MoDEL CoDE DR 5- 1 05(8) (emphasis added). 
76. MODEL RULES Rule l .7(b) (emphasis added). 
77. Financial General Bankshares, I nc. v.  Metzger, 523 F. Supp 744, 768 (D. D.C. 1 9 8 1  ) , vacated 
for lack of }11risdiction, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C.  Cir. 1 982) .  
78. fREEDMAN, s11pra note 7, at 1 77- 1 78 ( 1 990). 
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The Model Code's Disciplinary Rules which follow Canon 5 and concern 
conflict of interest make no mention of an appearance rationale. The 
Model Code's Ethical Considerations concerning conflict of interest, how­
ever, contain passages which reflect this approach. EC 5-6, for example, in 
discussing the issue of a lawyer naming himself as executor or trustee in an 
instrument he is drafting, advises that "care should be taken by the lawyer 
to avoid even the appearance of impropriety."79 The primary authority 
under the Model Code for invocation of the appearance approach, however, 
is Canon 9 of the Model Code which states that "A Lawyer Should Avoid 
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."80 
The appearance approach has generated a good deal of critical academic 
commentary.81 The Model Rules' provisions do not incorporate language 
which reflects an appearance approach. Deletion of Canon 9's language 
was intentional. "The framers of the . . .  Model Rules plainly meant to 
abandon it as an independently operating standard."82 Nonetheless, the ap­
pearance approach continues to be applied in some jurisdictions which have 
adopted the Model Rules.83 
The case law of conflict of interest contains innumerable passages which 
79. MODEL CODE EC 5-6. 
80. MODEL CODE Canon 9. 
8 1 .  See, e.g., Victor H .  Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the 
Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243, 264-65 ( 1 980); Howard M .  
Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw.  U.L. 
REv. 996 ( 1 979); Neil D .  O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive 
Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 1 3  ( 1 979). See also Anthony G. Flynn, Note, Disqualification of 
Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 343 ( 1 976);  Regina 
Zelonker, Note, Appearance of Impropriety as the Sole Ground for Disqualification, 3 1  U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1 5 1 6  ( 1 977).  
82. WOLFRAM, supra note I I , § 7 . 1 .4, at 322. 
83 .  See, e.g., First American Carriers, I nc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Ark. 1 990) 
("While Canon 9 is not expressly adopted by the Model Rules, the principle applies because its mean­
ing pervades the Rules and embodies their spirit."); Burnette v. Morgan, 794 S .W.2d 1 45, 1 48 (Ark. 
1 990) (The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized and "reassert[ed] that the principle is yet alive and, 
though not controlling, is a rock in the foundation upon which is built the rules guiding lawyers in their 
moral and ethical conduct.'1); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243, 249 (N.J. 1 988) 
("Contrary to the recommiindations of [the Court's Commission on the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct ] ,  this Court added paragraph (c) to the Model Rule 1 .7 to preserve in certain instances the 
'appearance of impropriety' doctrine . . .  That doctrine therefore has continuing vitality in  this state in 
situations covered by RPC 1 .7, and in those situations covered by other Rules that incorporate RPC 
1 .7, e.g., RPC 1 .9."); McCarthy v. Henderson, Inc., 587 A.2d 280, 283 (N.J. Super. 1 99 1 )  ("Subpara­
graph (c) of RPC 1 .7 was added to the ABA model rule by our Supreme Court when the RPCs were 
adopted. Its purpose is to retain the 'appearance of impropriety' doctrine in situations covered by RPC 
1 .9."); Gomez v. Superior Court, 7 1 7  P.2d 902, 904 (Ariz. 1 986) ("It would appear, however, that 
'appearance of impropriety,' however weakened by case law and its omission in the new Rules of Pro­
fessional Conduct, survives as a part of conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety should be 
enough to cause an attorney to closely scrutinize his conduct . . .  Where the conflict is so remote that 
there is insufficient appearance of wrongdoing, disqualification is not required."). 
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reflect the appearance approach.84 California cases, for example, utilize an 
"informed speculation" standard under which conduct is prohibited if it 
"naturally and reasonably gives rise to speculation that the professional 
judgment of counsel [,] as well as . . .  zealous representation[,] . . .  has 
been compromised."85 Different versions of the appearance approach ap­
pear in the doctrine. 
Courts that invoke the appearances standard in conflicts cases typically 
cite Canon 9 of the 1 969 Code, which states that "a lawyer should avoid 
even the appearance of impropriety." Beyond the initial invocation of Ca­
non 9, approaches vary. Some decisions describe the appearance that is to 
be avoided in terms of a violation of a more specific rule, such as the 
confidentiality rules of Canon 4 or the conflict of interest rules of Canon 5 .  
Still other courts purport to base disqualification solely on  Canon 9, even 
if the court is not prepared to say that any specific mandatory rule has 
been violated . . . .  Another approach has been to take appearances of im­
propriety into account as one of several factors but, at least implicitly, to 
refuse to rest disqualification solely upon it.86 
B. THE CURRENT CONFUSION 
The treatment of culpable mental states, often referred to by the Latin . 
phrase mens rea, is "the source of no end of confusion in the study and 
practice of criminal law."87 One of the problems has been the "variety, 
disparity and confusion" of judicial definitions of "the requisite but elusive 
mental element. "88 This ambiguity in terminology reflected a failure to 
identify and distinguish various underlying conceptual approaches to defin­
ing the mens rea for a particular offense. A phrase such as "willful, wanton 
negligence," for example, creates ambiguity, because it suggests three dif­
ferent and inconsistent culpability states. Negligence suggests inadvertence. 
Wanton suggests recklessness (i.e. conscious risk creation). Willful suggests 
intention. 89 
84. See generally WoLFRAM, supra note I I , § 7 . 1 .4, at 3 1 9-22 (description of how an appearance 
approach has been utilized by various courts). 
85. See People v. Jackson, 2 1 3  Cal. Rptr. 5 2 1 ,  523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 985) ;  People v. Singer, 275 Cal. 
Rptr. 9 1 1 ,  9 2 1  (Cal. Ct. App. 1 990) ("Even a potential conflict may require reversal if the record 
supports 'an informed speculation' that appellant's right to effective representation was prejudicially 
affected.") 
86. WoLFRAM, supra note I I , § 7 . 1 .4, at 3 1 9-20. 
87. Harold Edgar, Mens Rea, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE I 028 (Sanford H. Kadish 
ed .. 1 983) .  
88. See Morisette v. U .S. ,  342 U.S.  246, 252 ( 1 952) ("The unanimity with which [courts] have 
adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the 
variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element."). 
89. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 2.02 cmt.4 ( 1 985) ("As Jerome Hall has put it, the 
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The Model Penal Code jettisoned an accumulation of archaic and ill­
defined verbiage relating to mens rea, terms such as "malice," "scienter," 
"general criminal intent" and "specific criminal intent." The Model Penal 
Code then replaced this "quagmire of legal refuse" with four clearly de­
fined terms: "purpose," "knowledge," "recklessness" and "negligence. "90 
Each term reflects a different conceptual approach to defining culpability 
and the definitions clearly distinguish between these concepts .91 By simpli­
fying and clarifying both the terms and the concepts relating to culpability, 
the Model Penal Code "introduced both reason and structure to a previ­
ously amorphous area of Anglo-American law."92 
Conflict of interest doctrine is currently in a state similar to that of the 
criminal law's treatment of mens rea prior to the Model Penal Code. The 
following section demonstrates that the three responses to threat of attor­
ney impairment set forth above and their various permutations compete for 
expression in conflict of interest doctrine in the same way that ideas such 
as negligence, recklessness and intention competed for expression in mens 
rea doctrine before the Model Penal Code. Conflict of interest doctrine's 
failure to identify and distinguish clearly these three conceptual approaches 
and to acknowledge their inconsistencies results in a state of conceptual 
dissonance. 
1. Terminology 
A good place to begin in examining the ambiguity and inconsistency of 
current doctrine is with some examples of basic doctrinal terminology. 
a. The Meaning of "Conflict of Interest" 
Obviously, the most basic item in the vocabulary of conflict of interest 
doctrine is the phrase "conflict of interest." Although frequently used, it is 
seldom defined.93 Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules, for exam-
judicial 'opinions ruf! in terms of 'wanton and wilful negligence,' 'gross negligence,' and more i l luminat­
ing yet, 'that degree of negligence that is more than the negligence required to impose tort liability.' 
The apex of this infelicity ,�s 'wilful, wanton negligence,' which suggests a triple contradic­
tion-'negligence' implying inadvertence; 'wilful,' intention; and 'wanton' recklessness.' ") .  
90. Ronald L Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of t h e  Model Penal Code, 1 9  RUTGERS L.J. 575, 
at 575 ( 1 988)  ("Of the many advances in the law contributed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, 
none appears to be of greater immediate or long-term significance than that in the area of culpabil-
ity . . .  For centuries, the approach to mental components of crimes had been a quagmire of legal 
refuse . . . .  "); Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 3 1  HAs-
TINGS L.J. 8 1 5, 8 1 5  ( 1 980) ("In 1 953 the Model Penal Code drafters presented what may be their most 
significant and enduring achievement, a thoughtful definition of distinct levels of culpability."). 
9 1 .  See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 ( 1 980). 
92. Gainer, supra note 90, at  575. 
93 .  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n .3 ( 1 980) (" 'Conflict of interests' is a term that is often 
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pie, define the term. Treatments of the subject in treatises and casebooks 
frequently begin not with a definition of conflict of interest, but by provid­
ing examples of situations in which interests "conflict. " The reader is then 
left with the task of extracting the essential characteristics of a conflict of 
interest from these examples. 
Perhaps the classic attempt at establishing the meaning of the term con­
flict of interest is that found in Canon 6 of the American Bar Association's 
1 908 Canons of Professional Ethics: "a lawyer represents conflicting inter­
ests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which 
duty to another client requires him to oppose. "94 This language from Ca­
non 6 has been described as the way in which "conflict of interest is most 
commonly defined "95 and is cited in many modern cases.96 
But this alleged "definition " is not a definition. To "define " something is 
"to give the distinctive properties or characteristics of a thing " or "to de­
termine or describe the limits of' something.97 The language from Canon 6 
makes no attempt to describe the "distinctive properties or characteristics " 
of conflict of interest. It simply provides an example of one type of conflict, 
that between two clients. Nor does it "determine the limits " of conflict of 
interest. It excludes situations in which the lawyer's own interests or the 
interests of a third party threaten the lawyer's fulfillment of her obligation 
to her client, both of which are commonly included within the usage of 
"conflict of interest. " 
A more interesting aspect of this language from Canon 6 for the pur­
poses of this article is that it suggests a resulting impairment approach. 
The lawyer in the Canon 6 example is in a situation in which he must 
choose between disserving one client or disserving the other. Thus, he has 
reached the point of either resulting impairment or certainty of resulting 
impairment of his obligations to one or the other of his clients. This sug­
gests that conflict of interest does not exist until the point of impairment is 
reached. 
The closest the Model Code comes to explaining the term is in its defini-
used and seldom defined.") .  
94. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 ( 1 908) .  
95. L. Ray Patterson, An Analysis of Conflict of Interest Problems, 37 MERCER L. REV . 569,  570 
( 1 986) ("[C]onflict of interest is most commonly defined as a situation in which the lawyer has a duty 
to contend for one client that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose."). 
96. E.g., Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 356 n.3; Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, I nc. ,  646 F.2d 1 339, 1 347 
(9th Cir. 1 98 1  ); Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33 ,  39 (6th Cir. 1 979),  cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 
( 1 980); In re Gopman, 53 1 F.2d 262, 265 n .3  (5th Cir. 1 976); Committee on Professional Ethics & 
Grievances v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 1 69, 1 7 2  n.4 (3d Cir. 1 97 1 ) ;  State v. Manross, 532 N .E.2d 735 ,  738 
(Ohio 1 988) ,  cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1 083  ( 1 989) .  
97. WEBSTER'S N EW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 476-77 (Una­
bridged 2d ed. 1 979) [hereinafter WEBSTER's]. 
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tion of "differing interests" which states that such interests "include every 
interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a 
lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other 
interest. "9g Use of the words "will adversely affect" suggests again cer­
tainty of future impairment and, thus, the term's concern with resulting 
impairment rather than with risk. 
At other times, the term conflict of interest is defined as a situation 
which poses risk of impairment. One treatise instructs that "any factor that 
might interfere with the exercise of [the lawyer's] independence of judg­
ment creates a conflict of interest. "99 A leading article in the field also 
defines conflict of interest in terms of risk: 
A conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney, or any person repre­
sented by the attorney, has interests adverse in any way to the advice or 
course of action which should be available to the present client. A conflict 
exists whenever this tension exists even if the attorney eventually takes the 
course of action most beneficial to the present client. l ao 
Similarly, the Restatement defines a conflict of interest as "a substantial 
risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and 
adversely affected." 1 o1 
Treatment of the definition of the basic term "conflict of interest," thus, 
has not maintained a clear distinction between risk and resulting harm. 
Perhaps because of this ambiguity, resort has been made to an array of 
modifiers. Conflicts of interest have been described, among other things, as: 
"potential," "actual," 1 02 "latent," "acute,"1 03 "deep," 1 04 "relevant,"1 05 "sub­
jective," "objective,"  1 06 "per se." 1 07 Occasionally adverbs are called upon in 
drawing distinctions regarding conflict of interest. For example, language 
from a Supreme Court case attempts to draw a distinction on the basis of a 
lawyer "actively" representing conflicting interests. This language suggests 
98. MODEL CODE Definition ( I )  (emphasis added) .  
99 .  L. PATTERSON, supra note 4 ,  at  4- 1 (emphasis added). 
I 00. Aronson, supra note 24, at 809. 
1 0 1 .  R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) .  OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
1 99 1 )  (hereinafter RESTATEMft<i'T). 
1 02. E.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1 .7 cmt. [ I ] ;  In re Porter, 584 P.2d 744, 747 (Or. 1 978) .  
1 03 .  In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445, 447 (N.J .  1 974). 
1 04 .  HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 1 .8 :50 1 ,  at 27 1 n. l (referring to the case of Maxwell v .  
Superior Court, 639 P.2d 248 (Cal .  1 982), "the conflict of interest was so deep that a waiver should 
have been prohibited as a matter of public policy") (emphasis added). 
I 05. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 355 (Marshall, J. ,  dissenting) ("The appropriate question under the Sixth 
Amendment is whether an actual, relevallt conflict of interests existed during the proceedings.") (em-
phasis added) .  
· 
I 06. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1 2.2, at 705-08 (3d ed. 
1 989) (using the terms "subjective" and "objective" to describe conflicts of interest). 
1 07 .  Patterson, supra note 95, at 572. 
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that some form of "passively " representing conflicting interests i s  allowa­
ble. 1 0K These adjectives and adverbs, in turn, are seldom defined. 
b. The "Actual " vs. "Potential " Distinction 
Two adjectives frequently used to modify the term conflict of interest are 
"potential " and "actual. "1 09 The adjective "potential " means something 
"that can, but has not yet, come into being. " 1 1 0 Since risk itself refers to 
harm which is capable of occurring but has not yet occurred, use of the 
term "potential " connotes a focus on risk. This seems clear enough if the 
term "conflict of interest " itself is thought of as requiring resulting impair­
ment. Then the phrase "potential conflict of interest " would simply mean 
risk of impairment. Thus, a potential conflict is sometimes defined as 
describing a situation in which impairment is likely. 1 1 1  However, the phrase 
"potential conflict of interest " becomes ambiguous if one thinks of the term 
"conflict of interest " itself, as it is often used, as describing a situation 
presenting a risk of impairment. If the term "conflict of interest " is under­
stood in this risk sense, as it often is, then adding the word "potential " 
seems redundant. Taken literally, it would mean the potential of potential 
harm, that is, a risk of a risk. 
The adjective "actual " means "existing at the present time. " 1 1 2 This 
term suggests a concern with actual impairment. As with the adjective 
"potential, " however, ambiguity arises when "actual " is combined with the 
term "conflict of interest. " If the term "conflict of interest " is understood 
itself to mean a situation of resulting impairment, then the adjective "ac­
tual " seems redundant. If "conflict of interest " is understood to describe a 
situation presenting a risk of impairment, then use of the term "actual, " 
implying that something already has happened, seems contradictory since 
risk suggests something m the future which is threatening but has not yet 
happened. 
I 08. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U .S. 776, 783 ( 1 987) ("We have never held that the possibility of 
prejudice that 'inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,' justifies the adoption of an 
inflexible rule that would presume prejudice in all such cases . . .  I nstead, we presume prejudice 'only 
if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an ac­
tual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." ") (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 
348, 350; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688,. 692 ( 1 984) ) .  
1 09. See, e.g., MoDEL RuLEs Rule 1 .7 cmt. [ I ]  ("The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, 
appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation 
matters the parties and issues i nvolved and to determine whether there are aclllal or potential conflicts 
of interest.") (emphasis added) .  
1 1 0. WEBSTER's, supra note 97,  a t  1 409. 
I l l . See In re Porter, 584 P.2d 744, 747 (Or. 1 978) (stating that a "potential" conflict of interest is 
one in which the lawyer's independent professional judgement "is likely to be adversely affected . . .  ") 
(emphasis added). 
1 1 2. WEBSTER's, supra note 97, at  20. 
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"Actual" conflict of interest is sometimes used to refer to impairment 
which has already taken place. Indeed, a leading commentator states that 
"[w] hen commentators refer to an 'actual' conflict of interest, they ordina­
rily mean that the substantive impropriety that the conflict of interest rule 
was designed to prevent has in fact taken place." 1 1 3  At other times, actual 
conflict is defined as meaning a prospective certainty of impairment. 1 1 4  At 
still other times, the word "actual," when used to modify conflict of inter­
est, has been explicitly defined as referring to a situation presenting an 
intolerable amount of risk, not actual impairment or certainty of actual 
impairment. The Supreme Court, for example, has stated that " [a]n ar­
rangement represents an actual conflict of interest if its potential for mis­
conduct is deemed intolerable. The determination of whether there is an 
actual conflict of interest is therefore distinct from the determination of 
whether that conflict resulted in any actual misconduct."1 1 5 It is a poor 
word to convey the idea of prospective impairment regardless of the degree 
of probability, because it suggests that whatever it modifies has already 
happened. 
Rather than clarifying the ambiguity in the phrase "conflict of interest," 
the words "potential" and "actual" simply continue and compound the 
confusion. 
2. Commentators and Codes 
The confusion found in the vocabulary of conflict of interest reflects an 
underlying conceptual confusion as to the appropriate response to situations 
which threaten attorney impairment found both in commentators and eth­
ics codes dealing with conflict of interest. Both ethics codes and commenta­
tors have treated the choice of appropriate response ambiguously. 
a. Commentators 
Take, for example, the treatment of choice of response found in one of 
the classic works in the field, Henry Drinker's Legal Ethics . 1 1 6  Published in 
1953,  it is cited in modern conflict of interest cases and commentary. 1 1 7 In 
his section on conflicl of interest, Drinker notes that the lawyer is forbidden 
1 1 3 . FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at I 8 1  (emphasis added) .  
1 1 4. See In re Porter, 5 8 4  P.2d a t  747 ( a n  "actual" conflict of interest i s  one in which "the lawyer's 
independent professional judgment . . .  will be adversely affected"). 
1 1 5 .  Young v .  United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 48 1 U.S. 787, 807-08 n . l 8  ( 1 987) .  
1 1 6 .  H ENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS ( 1 953) .  Drinker was chairman of the American Bar Associa­
tion Standing Committee on Ethics and G rievances from 1 944 to 1 958.  
1 1 7. See, e.g., In re Porter, 584 P.2d at 748 (citing DRINKER, supra note 1 1 6, in  regard to a conflict 
of i nterest issue); Aronson, supra note 24, at 8 1 3; Patterson, supra note 95, at 570 n.4. 
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to  accept representation "from others in matters adversely affecting any 
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. "1 1 H 
Use of the words "adversely affecting" in this passage suggests a pure re­
sulting impairment approach. Drinker quotes from a case which provides 
that " [t]he test of inconsistency is . . .  whether his accepting the new re­
tainer will require him . . .  to do anything which will injuriously affect his 
former client . . . .  "1 1 9 Again this language is consistent with a resulting 
impairment approach, though this time in its anticipatory form. Drinker 
also quotes the passage from Canon 6 of the 1908 Canons discussed in the 
preceding subsection of this article on the vocabulary of conflict of interest, 
Part I I .  B. l .a supra, stating that "a Ia wyer represents conflicting interests 
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty 
to another cl ient requires him to oppose."1 20 As noted earlier, this passage 
suggests a resulting impairment approach since the lawyer in the example 
in the quoted passage is at the point of actual impairment of his obligations 
to one or the other of the two clients he represents. 
Drinker also instructs that the duty to avoid conflict of interest requires 
"not only the avoidance of a relation which will obviously and presently 
involve the duty to contend for one client what his duty to the other pres­
ently requires him to oppose, but also the probability or possibility that 
such a situation will develop."1 2 1  Here a risk avoidance approach is clearly 
expressed . The fact that this sentence simultaneously expresses two differ­
ent versions of a risk approach, one prohibiting probable and the other pos­
sible impairment, adds to the ambiguity. Drinker returns to the risk ap­
proach with the admonition that a lawyer "should avoid not only situations 
where a conflict of interest is actually presented, but also those in which a 
conflict is likely to develop."1 22 Drinker also quotes Justice Story in Wil­
liams v. Reed asserting that " [w]hen a client employs an attorney, he has a 
right to presume, if the latter be silent on the point, that he has no engage­
ments, which interfere, in any degree, with his exclusive devotion to the 
cause confided to him; that he has no interest, which may betray his judg­
ment or endanger his fidelity."1 23 This sentence seems simultaneously to 
express both resulting impairment and risk approaches. 
Leaving no source of conceptual inconsistency untapped, Drinker also 
suggests an appearance approach. " [E ]ven where all parties agree, the ap­
pearance of a lawyer on both sides of the same controversy, particularly in 
1 1 8 .  DRINKER, supra note 1 1 6, at 1 03-04 (emphasis added). 
1 1 9 .  !d. at I 05 (quoting In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 952-53 ( 1 897)) (emphasis added) .  
1 20. /d. at 1 03 (quoting CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 ( 1 908)) .  
1 2 1 .  !d. at I 04 (emphasis added). 
1 22. !d. at I 05 (emphasis added). 
1 23 .  /d. (quoting Williams v. Reed, 3 Mason 405, 4 1 8  ( 1 824)) (emphasis added). 
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cases of some notoriety, will often give an impression to the public which is 
most unfortunate for the reputation of the bar,  and which of itself should 
be decisive. " 1 24 In sum, Drinker's treatise in the space of three pages sug­
gests simultaneous use of an appearance approach, multiple versions of a 
resulting impairment approach, and multiple versions of a risk approach, 
with no seeming awareness of the inconsistency. 
Similar ambiguities are found in more modern scholarship on conflict of 
interest. Take, for example, a more recent article on attorney conflict of 
interest, described in conjunction with another article in  a recent edition of 
a leading treatise as " [t] he best general analysis of conflicts of interest 
problems." 1 25 The article 1 26 begins by quoting the Canon 6 language men­
tioned previously which suggests a resulting impairment approach . 1 27 It fol­
lows this language by stating that the Model Code "defines conflict of in­
terest in terms of the inherent dilution of a lawyer's loyalty toward his 
client ." 1 2R Mention of "dilution" of the lawyer's loyalty here ·seems to sug­
gest that this passage like the passage from Canon 6 concerns resulting 
impai rment. In the next paragraph, the author refers to the use by courts 
and ethics committees of "certain basic ethical principles . . .  in determin­
ing which situations cause or are likely to cause a dilution of the loyalty or 
impairment of the independent judgment of an attorney ." 1 29 The use of the 
"cause . . .  a dilution . . .  or impairment" language suggests a resulting 
impairment approach . The use of the "likely to cause . . .  a dilution . . .  
or impairment" language suggests a risk avoidance approach. 
Two paragraphs later, despite the fact that these earl ier passages suggest 
either a resulting impairment approach or a choice between resulting im­
pairment and risk avoidance approaches, the author defines conflict of in­
terest in  a way which clearly adopts a risk avoidance approach and explic­
itly rejects a resulting impairment approach: 
A conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney, or any person repre­
sented by the attorney, has interests adverse in any way to the advice or 
course of action which should be available to the present client. A conflict 
exists whenever this tension exists even if the attorney eventually takes the 
course of action most beneficial to the present client . 1 30 
.� 
Having just defined conflict of interest in terms of risk avoidance, the 
author in the next sentence describes the possible courses of action which a 
1 24. /d. (emphasis added) .  
1 25. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2 ,  at 2 1 7  n. l .  
1 26 .  Aronson, supra note 24. 
1 27 .  /d. at 808. 
1 28 .  !d. 
1 29 .  !d. at 809 (emphasis added). 
1 30. /d. 
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conscientious lawyer may take when "a conflict or potential conflict" 
arises . 1 3 1  Using the alternatives of "conflict or potential conflict" after hav­
ing just defined conflict of interest as potential impairment introduces the 
ambiguity, discussed above, i nherent in  the term "potential conflict of in­
terest." Either the word "potential" is simply redundant, or it literally sug­
gests a focus on avoiding the risk of risk. Later the author, citing Drinker's 
treatise, instructs that " [t] he key to preventing unintentional or unwitting 
violations lies in anticipating the probability or possibility that a conflict 
situation will develop." 1 32 This passage again suffers from the ambiguity of 
suggesting concern with risk of risk. It also expresses two different versions 
of the risk avoidance approach, one based on probable risk and the other on 
possible risk. 
The author also uses the term "perceived conflicts" without any explana­
tion or definition . 1 33 The use of the word "perceived" suggests an appear­
ance approach . The author then explicitly adopts an appearance approach, 
urging that it is "particularly applicable to potential conflicts of interest" 1 34 
but not acknowledging its inconsistency with the suggestions of other ap­
proaches in  the prior paragraphs. As with the Drinker treatise, the author 
simultaneously suggests multiple approaches without clearly distinguishing 
between them. 
b.  Ethics Codes 
One finds similar problems in the Model Code's provisions on conflict of 
interest. Language from the Model Code's DR 5- 1 0 1  (A) and DR's 5-
1 05 (A) & (B) barring situations i n  which the lawyer's professional judg­
ment "will be" affected was quoted in Part TI(A) ( l  ), supra, as exemplify­
ing an anticipatory resulting impairment approach . Language from these 
same DR's barring situations in which the lawyer's professional judgment 
"reasonably may be" or "is l ikely to be" affected was quoted in Part 
I I (A)(2) ,  supra, as exemplifying a risk avoidance approach. The result and 
risk language in each of these rules is phrased in the disjunctive. The law­
yer must avoid situations in  which his i ndependent judgment "will be or 
reasonably may be affected" according to DR 5- l 0 1  (A) and situations in 
which his independent judgment "will be or is likely to be" affected accord­
ing to DR's 5 - 1 05 (A) & (B). The language of the Model Code's EC's 
makes multiple references to both actual impairment and risk of i mpair­
ment, mirroring the bifurcation found in the DR's. 
1 3 1 .  /d. 
1 32. /d. at 8 1 3  (emphasis added). 
1 33 .  /d. at 8 1 0. 
1 34. /d. at 8 1 0- 1 1 .  
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The Model Code's general conflict of interest rules thus contain sugges­
tions of two different approaches, resul ting impairment and risk avoidance, 
without clearly distinguishing between them. To compound this ambiguity, 
the Model Code's Canon 9 ,  as mentioned previously, provides for an ap­
pearance approach. Many courts, commentators and ethics committees 
have freely imported an appearance standard from Canon 9 into analysis of 
conflict of interest issues arising under Canon S 's provisions . 1 35 
The Model Rules conflict provisions are not as ambiguous as those of the 
Model Code in terms of references to multiple standards .  The Model 
Rules ' general conflict of interest provision, Rule 1 .7 ,  provides in part (b) 
that " [a ]  lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client may be materially limited," a clear reference to a risk avoidance 
approach. There is no language in the actual Rule similar to the "will be 
. . .  affected" language in the Model Code's D R  5- l O l (A) and DR's 5-
1 OS (A) & ( 8) .  
However, the Comments to  Rule 1 .7 are more ambiguous. Comment [ 1 ]  
to Rule 1 .  7 refers to "actual or potential conflicts of i nterest" without de­
fining those terms. As mentioned previously, these terms have been treated 
quite ambiguously in terms of underlying conceptual approach. Comment 
[4] also contains some ambiguity. I t  provides: 
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recom­
mend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of 
the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect fore­
closes alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Para­
graph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself pre­
clude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a 
conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere 
with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alter­
natives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on 
behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client 
wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. 
The fi rst sentence clearly provides an example of resulting impairment: 
the lawyer's functioning is impaired because he "cannot consider, recom­
mend or carry out an ippropriate course of action for the client . . . .  " I n  
the next sentence, the Comment mentions that " [t] h e  conflict i n  effect 
forecloses alternatives," suggesting resulting impairment. Comment [ 4 ] 's 
statement that one of " [ t] he critical questions" is whether the conflict "will 
materially interfere with the lawyer's i ndependent professional judgment" 
also indicates a focus on resulting impairment. Comment [6] states that 
" [t]he lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect 
1 35 .  See WOLFRAM, supra note I I , § 7 . 1 .4, at 3 1 9-22. 
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on representation of a client. . . .  A lawyer may not allow related business 
interests to affect representation . . . .  " Comment [9] states that " [a] law-
yer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question 
that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client 
would be adversely affected." These passages from the Comments to Rule 
1 .  7 seem to reflect a resulting impairment approach with their emphasis on 
effect on the lawyer's representation. 
Other passages from the Comments reflect a risk approach, similar to 
that seen in the actual text of Rule 1 .7 .  Comment [4] uses the phrase "a 
possible conflict ."  Again,  this introduces the ambiguity found in the phrase 
"potential conflict ."  
The Restatement represents a significant step forward i n  clarity with re­
gard to conceptual approach. I ts defin ition of conflict of interest, for exam­
ple, clearly adopts a risk approach. 1 36 But elsewhere in the Restatement one 
still finds remnants of the same sorts of ambiguities found in the sources 
treated above. I n  the Reporter's Memorandum accompanying  Tentative 
Draft No. 3 of the Restatement's conflicts provisions, for example, a pas­
sage provides that the black letter rules in the conflicts chapter state "two 
i mportant concepts." First, "the general conflict-of-interest standard as­
sesses whether a 'substantial risk' of a conflict exists . . .  " 1 37 S ince a con­
flict is defined by the Restatement as a substantial risk, use of the phrase 
" 'substantial risk' of a conflict" repeats the ambiguity explored earlier i n  
the phrase "potential conflict of  i nterest" when conflict of  interest itself i s  
defined in terms of  risk. L iterally, the phrase "substantial risk of a conflict" 
as conflict is defined by the Restatement means substantial risk of a sub­
stantial risk. This same ambiguity is seen in the Comments following Sec­
tion 20 1 ,  which refer several times to "potential conflicts." 
The second of the "two important concepts" mentioned in the Reporter's 
Memorandum is that "the test for a conflict is whether a 'material and 
adverse effect' will befall a client's representation because of stated inter­
ests ." 1 3R Choice of the words "will befall" conveys the anticipatory version 
of the resulting impairment approach and seems to contradict both the im­
mediately preceding "risk" concept put forth in the Reporter's Memoran­
dum and the Restatement's basic definition of conflict of interest as involv­
ing "substantial risk." 
A resulting impairment approach is also suggested by the hypothetical 
1 36. RESTATEMENT § 20 1 (a conflict of interest exists i f  there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's 
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or 
by the lawyer's duties to another current client, to a former client, or to a third person) . 
1 37 .  RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 3 ,  1 990) Reporter's Memorandum to the Members of the 
Institute at xxi. 
1 38 .  !d. (emphasis added) .  
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posed in I llustration 1 of the Comments following Section 20 1 .  Il lustration 
1 presents a situation i n  which the " [l ] awyer's representation will have an 
"adverse effect" on both [clients] A and B . . . .  " 1 39 This illustration thus 
suggests a situation of certainty of impairment, rather than one presenting 
one of substantial risk. I llustration 1 also provides that " [l ] awyer will have 
duties to A that restrict the zeal with which the lawyer urges B's posi­
tion ." 1 40 Again this suggests certainty rather than substantial risk of 
impairment. 
C. R EMEDIES FOR THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIO N  
The previous sections have demonstrated that a primary source of confu­
sion in conflict of interest doctrine is its failure clearly to distinguish result­
ing impairment, risk avoidance, and appearance approaches in  formulating 
its response to threats of attorney impairment. Based on the view that one 
must understand a problem before one can hope to cure it, the primary 
point  of Part ·u i s  to demonstrate this confusion and the ambiguity it in­
troduces i nto conflicts doctrine.  
Resolution of the question of choice of conceptual approach is beyond 
the scope of this article. My primary argument here is that we must rem­
edy this confusion as a fi rst step toward building a comprehensible doctrine 
of attorney conflict of i nterest. Clearly distinguishing different conceptual 
approaches is an essential part of that process. We must reach some agree­
ment on what conceptual approach or approaches are appropriate and then 
clearly communicate that choice. 
Conflict of interest doctrine could continue to utilize multiple approaches 
and just do a better job of articulating and distinguishing them. To draw 
again on the criminal analogy, the Model Penal Code in its treatment of 
mens rea clearly defines and distinguishes four different conceptual ap­
proaches to defin ing mens rea in an introductory section: purpose, knowl­
edge, recklessness and negligence. In later sections when defin ing particular 
offenses, it then is  explicit about which type of mens rea is required for 
each offense. Thus, its crime of negligent homicide is clear that negl igence 
is the required level of culpability and the meaning of the term negligence 
is clearly set out in 'the introductory definition. 
If conflict of interest doctrine took a similar approach, the ethics codes 
might start their treatment of conflict of interest with a set of definitions of 
different approa�hes to the boundary between permissible and impermissi­
ble attorney conduct in conflict of i nterest situations. In later sections, the 
ethics codes could then choose which approach was appropriate for a par-
1 39. RESTATEMENT § 20 1 cmt. 6. 
1 40. /d. 
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ticular situation and by  using the terms defined in the introductory section 
send a clear message about the choice of conceptual approach to be used in 
that setting. Resulting impairment might be used in some situations ,  risk i n  
others, and appearance in stil l others. 
A different way to clarify the confusion about conceptual approach 
would be to eliminate certain approaches in favor of one unifying approach 
to be used in a l l  situations. 
I II .  RISK A voiDANCE: THE EssENTIAL QuESTIONS 
Part II argued that a primary source of confusion in conflict of interest 
doctrine is its failure clearly to distinguish various conceptual approaches 
in  formulating its response to threat of attorney impairment. The following 
section argues that another p rimary source of confusion is current doc­
trine's failure to develop clearly and completely the analytical components 
of the risk avoidance approach.  Analyzing attorney conflict of i nterest is­
sues from a risk avoidance perspective i nvolves a series of questions con­
cerning what is at risk, the definition of acceptable risk, and who decides 
these questions. Current doctrine does not clearly articulate or answer 
these essential questions. 
A. WHAT IS AT RIS K ?  
I n  order to  assess risk, one  must fi rst determine what is a t  risk. What 
facets of a lawyer's functioning do conflict of interest rules seek to protect 
from impairment? The answer to this preliminary question provides the 
logical and necessary focal point for analyzing the risk of attorney i mpair­
ment presented i n  any particular situation. Lack of a clear answer to the 
question of what is  at risk is a source of confusion in present conflict of 
interest doctrine .  
Comparison with a criminal statute utilizing a r isk approach is a useful 
device for il lustrating conflict of i nterest doctrine's lack of clarity in  provid­
ing a focal point for risk analysis. The Model Penal Code, for i nstance, 
defines the crime of reckless endangerment as recklessly engaging in con­
duct which creates an unacceptable risk to another person of "death or 
serious bodily injury ." 1 4 1  This statute clearly states the risks with which it 
1 4 1 .  Model Penal Code § 2 1 1 .2, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, provides: 
A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may 
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Recklessness and danger 
shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at  or in the direction of an­
other, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded. 
MODEL PE:-JAL CODE § 2.02(2)(C) defines recklessly as follows: 
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is concerned, those o f  "death o r  serious bodily injury."  What i s  the analog 
in conflict of interest doctrine to "death or substantial bodily injury" in the 
reckless endangerment statute? 
There are many components to the functioning of a lawyer which may 
be threatened with impairment and might comprise this analog. These 
components may be described in a variety of ways . One descriptive method 
is to focus on the various roles a lawyer plays, such as advisor, negotiator, 
or advocate . Another method is to focus on the set of obligations which a 
lawyer must fulfill in performing these various roles. This set of obligations 
includes many which are owed to the lawyer's client, such as the obliga­
tions of confidentiality, 142 di ligence, 1 43 competence 1 44 and zeaJ I 45 in pursuing 
cl ient interests . It also includes obligations owed to institutions of the legal 
system within which the lawyer works, such as the duty of candor toward a 
tribunal 1 46 and the duty to monitor the factual and legal basis of  claims 
asserted before a tribunal . 1 47 The lawyer owes still other obligations to 
third parties, such as the obligation to communicate with a represented 
party only through counsel . 1 48 
Which of these roles and obligations is conflict of interest doctrine con­
cerned with protecting? Unfortunately, current doctrine answers this ques­
tion in rather ambiguous fashion. There are several sources of ambiguity. 
1 .  Lack of Clarity in Conflict of Interest Doctrine 
Since formulating an appropriate response to risk of impairment of an 
attorney's roles and obligations is the central task of attorney conflict of 
interest doctrine, one m ight expect conflict of interest provisions such as 
those found in the Model Code and Model Rules to make direct and ex­
plicit reference to the various roles and obligations which comprise the 
functioning of a lawyer. Taking a role approach, such a provision might 
instruct that lawyers are to avoid unacceptable risks of impairing their 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result 
from his conduct. The risk rnust be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature 
and purpose of the actor's '�onduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard in­
volves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would ob­
serve in the actor's situation. 
1 42. MODE!. RULES Rule 1 .6 ;  MODEL CODE Canon 4, DR 4- 1 0 1 .  
1 43 .  MODEL RcLES Rule 1 .3 ;  MODEL CoDE D R  6- I O I (A)(3) ,  EC 6-4. 
1 44. MODEL RVLES Rule 1 . 1 ;  MODEL CODE DR 6- I O I (A).  
1 45 .  MoDEL CODE Canon 7.  See also MODEL RULE 1 .3 cmt.  ("A lawyer should act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." ) .  
1 46. MODEL RULES Rule 3 .3 .  
1 47 .  MODEL RuLES Rule 3 . 1 ; MODEL CODE DR 7- ! 02(A) ( I ) , (2) ;  FED. R.  C!v .  P. I I  ( 1 969).  
1 48 .  MODE!. RULES Rule 4.2; MODEL CODE DR 7- 1 04(A)( I ) . 
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rqles such as  advisor, negotiator, and advocate. Taking an obligation ap­
proach, it might instruct that lawyers are to avoid unacceptable r isks of 
impairing obligations such as confidentiality, dil igence, competence and 
zeal. 
Cases and ethics opinions regarding conflict of interest often make ex­
plicit reference to the underlying obligations and roles of the lawyer . 1 49 But 
conflict of interest doctrine in stating its general principles, such as the 
Model Code 's DR's and the Model Rules '  black letter rules, typically does 
not take such an approach .  I nstead of using the roles or obligations which 
comprise the standard terminology for describing the lawyer's functioning, 
the conventional approach of conflict of interest doctrine is to express what 
is at risk in  terms of positive obligation ,  which appear nowhere in the ethics 
codes except in  the conflict of interest provisions, such as obligations of 
"loyalty" and "independent professional judgment." 
Probably the term most often used to describe what conflict of i nterest 
rules seek to protect is the word "loyalty ." 1 50 It is unclear what the term 
"loyalty" means . 1 5 1  Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules define or 
explain i t . 1 52 One possibil ity is that "there is no distinct ethical imperative 
of loyalty." 1 53 According to this interpretation, loyalty is s imply a short-
1 49. See. e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 829 ( 1 st Cir. 1 987 )  (In relation to a conflict 
of interest involving the terms of a settlement, the court focused on the obligations owed by the lawyer 
to the client in the context of settlement. It noted that as counsel for a class of plaintiffs the lawyer 
"owed plaintiffs a duty of undivided loyalty: it was obligated to present the offer to plaintiffs, to explain 
its costs and benefits, and to ensure that the offer received full and fair consideration by the members of 
the class." !d. ) .  
1 50. See, e.g., GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 1 8 , at 603 ("ensuring loyalty is a primary concern of 
rules that prohibit concurrent conflicts"); WoLFRAM, supra note I I , at 3 1 6  ("I t  is clear that  there are 
two broad principles underlying all conflict rules for lawyers: the principle of loyalty and the principle 
of confidentiality."); MODEL CODE EC 5 - 1  ("Neither [the lawyer's] personal interests, the interests of 
other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to di lute his loyalty to his client.") 
and EC 5- 1 4  ("Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes 
his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or 
di lute his loyalty to a client."); Model Rule 1 .7 cmt. [ 1 ] - [4] (describing the requirements of the Model 
Rules' general conflict of interest provision, Rule 1 .7 ,  in terms of "loyalty to a client") .  
1 5 1 .  Lawry, supra note 6 ,  a t  I 089, suggesting that the concept o f  loyalty: 
[ I]s not defined or explicated in any of the various codes of ethics that have dominated the 
governing of American lawyers in the 20th Century. In these codes, the concept is almost 
exclusively util ized in the setting of discussions about conflicts of interest. It is referred to in 
those settings as if the concept itself were clear, and ditllculties" only arise when an issue of 
divided or conflicting loyalties is present. My premise is that the concept is not clear at al l .  
When the conflict of interest issues arise, the use of the principle of loyalty is problematic 
because we really do not have a firm grasp on the concept itself. 
See also ANDREW l. KAUFMANN. PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBI LITY 38 (3d ed. 1 989)  
( "What we mean when we say a lawyer owes a 'duty of loyalty' to  a client is at the core of our  notion 
of what kind uf adversary system we have. There is no obvious answer."). 
1 5 2 .  Lawry, supra note 6, at I 089. 
1 53 .  FRHDMAS, supra note 7,  at 1 74. Freedman states that "[a] Ithough loyalty is sometimes cited 
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hand way of describing the entire set of lawyer obligations imposed by 
rules outside conflict of interest doctrine. 1 54 A variation on this interpreta­
tion is that loyalty is a shorthand term for some subset of these obliga­
tions . 1 55 I f  this is the intended meaning, surely there is a clearer way to 
convey it. Describing the focal point for conflicts analysis using terms 
found only in the conflict of interest provisions and nowhere else in  the 
ethics codes conveys the confusing message that conflict of interest is some­
thing unrelated to the roles and obligations found elsewhere in the ethics 
codes, rather than something intimately connected with protecting those 
roles and obligations.  
Does loyalty i nclude only those obligations running to the cl ient? I n  
other words, is risk of impairment of those attorney obligations running to 
legal insti tutions or to third parties beyond conflict of interest doctrine's 
sphere of concern? A lawyer's loyalty is  normally described as being owed 
to the client and the obligations most often mentioned in connection with it 
are ones owed to the client, suggesting that the obligations to legal i nstitu­
tions and to third parties are beyond the province of attorney conflict of 
interest doctrine. Yet Model Code EC 5-9, in  describing the reasons for 
inclusion of the advocate-witness rule among the Model Code's conflict of 
interest provisions, mentions among other rationales for the rule that "op­
posing counsel may be handicapped i n  challenging the credibility of the 
lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case," a ration­
ale clearly grounded in the notion of fairness to an opposing party rather 
than some obligation to the client. 
Does loyalty include all of the obligations a lawyer has toward a client, 
or just some of them? One recent treatise offers the alternatives of equat­
ing the term simply with the obl igation of zeal or with the obligations of 
zeal, competence, communication and confidentiality conjunctively . 1 56 An­
other recent treatise offers the interpretation that "loyalty relates to zeal or 
diligence" disjunctively, without explaining what it means by the term "re­
lates ." 1 57 Unl ike the fi rst treatise, which expressly includes confidentia lity 
as a separate ethical concern in discussions of conflicts of interest, there is no distinct ethical imperative 
of loyalty." !d. 
1 54. See Lawry, supra note 6, at 1 1 02-03. Lawry quotes philosopher Josiah Royce, who defines 
loyalty as "the wil l ing . . .  and thorough going devotion of a person to a cause . .  .' [D]evotion to a 
cause' encompasses all of the duties owed by the one loyal to that which, or to whom, the duties are 
owed." ( emphasis added). !d. 
! 55 .  See FRHDMAN, supra note 7, at 1 74 (stating loyalty "can be equated with zeal, or it can serve 
as a convenient way of saying confidentiality, zeal, competence, and communication.") ;  RoBERT H.  
ARO:\SO:oi & 001\ALD T. WECKSTEIN. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1:-J A NCTSHELL 224 (2d ed. 
! 99 1 )  (asserting that " [L]oyalty relates to zeal or dil igence") .  
1 56. FREEDMAN, supra note 7 ,  at 1 74 .  
! 57. ARONSON & WECKSTEIN, supra note ! 55, at 224. 
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in one of its definitions of loyalty, the second treatise treats confidential ity 
as not being included in the definition of loyalty . 1 58 
Perhaps we should jettison the term loyalty from conflict of interest ter­
minology and substitute a term, such as "the representation" or "the law­
yer's professional functioning" which would serve more clearly as an aggre­
gate term for the lawyer's set of ethical obligations. Referring directly to 
the more concrete roles and obligations found outside the conflict rules 
would simplify the analysis by allowing us to resort directly to those roles 
and obligations in assessing risk without stumbling over how to interpret 
loyalty. 
Yet another possibility is that there is a distinct ethical imperative of 
loyalty, that it adds some dimension to the set of obligations of a lawyer 
not imposed by rules outside conflict of interest doctrine. 1 59 M ichael Bayles, 
for example, treats loyalty as an obligation distinct from such other obliga­
tions as diligence and competence. 1 60 If we i nterpret loyalty as adding a 
distinct substantive dimension and reject the "shorthand" interpretation 
advanced above, what is this added dimension? 1 6 1  Does adoption of this 
"substantive" interpretation mean that conflict of interest doctrine is not 
concerned with i mpairment of other lawyer obligations? 
The problem with a "substantive" interpretation of loyalty i n  terms of 
the clarity of conflict of interest doctrine is that it burdens conflict of inter­
est rules with the task of expressing two complex ideas: the appropriate 
response to threat of attorney impairment and whatever discrete dimension 
loyalty is intended to add to the lawyer's set of obligations. Each alone is a 
difficult task. Relying on conflict of interest doctrine to do both is simply 
asking for confusion . One need not abandon the idea of giving loyalty a 
distinct substantive meaning i n  order to cure this problem . But if loyalty is 
to add some new dimension to the lawyer's obligations, devoting a separate 
section of the ethics code to establishing its meaning, just as we do for 
example with confidential ity, would promote clarity. 
So far we have been looking  at loyalty as the analog to "death or sub­
stantial bodily i njury" in the crime of reckless endangerment. I n  other 
words, we have looked to it as supplying the answer to the question of what 
is protected by conflict of interest doctrine. The term loyalty is sometimes 
construed as supplying the answer to a different question . Sometimes loy-
1 58 .  !d. at 223-224 (treating loyalty and confidentiality under separate headings and stating that 
" [w) hereas loyalty relates to zeal or diligence, confidentiality relates to information which the client has 
entrusted to her lawyer.' ") .  
1 59. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 77-83 (2nd ed. 1 989) (describing loyalty 
as an obligation distinct from those such as dil igence and competence ) .  
1 60. !d. 
1 6 1 .  See generally, Lawry, supra note 6; L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of 
Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909 ( 1 980) (both discussing the possible meaning of the concept of loyalty) . 
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alty is viewed as  suplying the answer to  the question of  what is the appro­
priate response to threat of attorney impairment, the issue examined in 
Part I I , supra. Michael Bayles, for example, states that loyalty means 
"Don't allow your own interests or the interests of others to divert, dilute, 
or diminish your efforts . " 1 62 This sounds l ike the resulti ng impairment ap­
proach to responding to threats of attorney impairment. Kenneth Penegar 
writes that " [t ]he duty of undivided loyalty could be construed to mean 
that the lawyer's personal l ife should be regulated to prevent the impres­
sion that personal opinions are at cross-purposes with the legal position of 
the client. " 1 63 This sounds like the appearance approach to responding to 
threats of attorney impairment. 
Greater clarity i n  this area might be accomplished by providing clearer 
definitions for existing terms such as "loyalty." Or perhaps it would be best 
to jettison these terms in favor of some new and clearly defined terminol­
ogy. Either way, we need to have the question of what is at risk clearly 
asked and answered by conflict of i nterest doctrine in  order to have a focal 
point for analyzing risk of attorney impairment. 
2. Lack of Clarity in  Defining the Underlying Roles and Obligations 
Once we have answered the question of what aspects of the lawyer's 
functioning the conflict of interest provisions seek to protect, problems still 
remain in establishing a clear focal point for analyzing risk of attorney 
impairment. A separate source of con fusion in establ ishing this basic focal 
point derives from the fact that many of the underlying obligations we are 
concerned with protecting are neither static nor well defined themselves. 
The assertions that lawyers owe their clients duties such as confidentiality, 
dil igence, competence and zeal are not controversial as abstract proposi­
tions. Closer examination of such obligations, however, often reveals con­
siderable disagreement about both the descriptive question of what the con­
tours of such obligations presently are as well as the prescriptive question 
of what the contours of those obligations ought to be. 1 64 The contours of 
many of these obligations are and have been poorly defined, in a state of 
transition and subject t� variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction . 1 65 I n  
1 62 .  BAYLES, supra note 1 59 ,  at 79. 
1 63 .  Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. R Ev .  307, 323 ( 1 988) .  
1 64. See William H .  Simon, Ethical Discretion in  Lawyering, 10 1  HARV .  L .  REv.  1 083 ,  1 084-86 
( 1 988) .  Professor Simon describes two broad tendencies in this debate about the content of lawyer 
obligations as the "libertarian" and "regulatory" approaches. 
1 65 .  STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON. JR .. REGULATION UF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STAN­
DARDS vii-viii ( 1 992) .  Gillers and Simon note that more than 35 jurisdictions have adopted the Model 
Rules, but "there are notable variations among the jurisdictions, especially with respect to such crucial 
matters as conflicts and confidentiality . . .  These state variations graphically i l lustrate the disagree-
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other wo�ds, these points of reference often are themselves blurred and 
sometimes moving targets. 
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical taken from the conflict 
of interest section of a leading professional responsibility casebook. 1 66 An 
associate at a large firm has been working on a large and complicated civil 
case for the past two years. His firm represents a defendant in the case 
which is pending in a trial court in an area of the country known for sub­
stantial anti-semitism among the local population from which the jury will 
be chosen . A lthough the associate has done excellent work on the case and 
would be a logical member of the trial team, the firm is considering remov­
ing him from the case because he is J ewish and thus l ikely to arouse the 
prejudice of the j urors. 
What is at risk in  this hypothetical is the courtroom effectiveness of the 
team of trial lawyers in the face of the jury's prejudice. While all would 
agree that a firm owes a client a duty to have its lawyers perform compe­
tently and effectively in their role as courtroom advocates, the precise lim­
its of this obligation are unclear. Does the duty of competent courtroom 
advocacy encompass an obligation to cater to the prejudices of particular 
jurors or judges? There is no clear answer to this question . The proper 
boundaries of courtroom advocacy have been and continue to be much 
debated . 1 67 
The important point is that how this obligation of effective courtroom 
advocacy is defined is critical for the conflict of interest analysis. I f  it does 
encompass an obligation to cater to a jury's prejudices, then it is certainly 
put at risk by keeping the associate on the case. If it does not, then what is 
at risk is beyond the scope of the conflict of interest rules. The point is that 
we must look to the contours of the underlying obligations lawyers owe 
their clients in terms of effective courtroom performance in order to have a 
point of reference for judging risk under the conflicts rules. The starting 
point for answering this problem requires us to answer a question which is 
outside the realm of conflict of interest. If such a question is not clearly 
answered by the rules dealing with the underlying obligation, that ambigu­
ity transfers onto the conflict of interest analysis .  
This problem should not be overstated . Many, perhaps most, conflict of 
interest scenarios put at risk aspects of lawyer obligations which are well 
established and defined. But as long as there is ambiguity in defining un­
derlying obligations and roles of lawyers, this ambiguity will continue to 
ments over how lawyers should conduct themselves . . .  " !d. 
1 66. Gll.LERS & DoRSEN, supra note 1 8, at 6 1 3 . 
1 6  7. The arguments for and against reassignment of the associate are set forth id. at 6 1 3- 1 4. A 
"regulatory" approach to advocacy would probably argue that lawyers owe their clients no such duty, 
while a "libertarian" approach might well argue in favor of such a duty. See Simon, supra note 1 64 .  
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plague conflict of interest analysis which touches on these gray areas. 
B.  W HAT RISKS ARE ACCEPTABLE? 
Perhaps the central question for a risk approach to conflict of interest is  
defining which risks are acceptable and which are unacceptable. At what 
point does the risk of impairment of an attorney's functioning become un­
acceptable? In turn, this question leads to several subsidiary questions hav­
ing to do with both the magnitude and the justifiability of the risk. 
l .  What Magnitude of Risk Is  Acceptable? 
Current doctrine sends a wide range of inconsistent messages about how 
much risk should be tolerated. At times it expresses abhorrence of any risk. 
At times it is accepting of substantial risk. At still other times, it d isplays 
various intermediate degrees of risk aversion falling between these 
extremes. 
a .  The Zero Risk Fallacy 
One possible answer to the question of what magnitude of risk is accept­
able is the simple answer that none is acceptable. I n  other words, conflict 
of interest doctrine might adopt an attitude of "zero risk tolerance," insist­
ing that lawyers avoid situations which create any risk of impairment of a 
professional role or obligation . Such an attitude of "zero risk tolerance" 
has initial intuitive appeal , since risk of impairment certainly seems like 
something we would want to discourage. Expression of such an attitude 
would also make a useful rhetorical device for those seeking to defend the 
image and reputation of the bar. 
One finds expression of zero risk tolerance in conflict of i nterest doctrine 
in varying guises . In an "exhortation" form, it appears as a caution to law­
yers to avoid all risk. I n  an "assertion" form, it appears as a claim that 
certain recommended courses of conduct in fact achieve a state of zero 
risk. 
Upon examination, b'bth forms of the zero risk tolerance notion usually 
are misleading rhetorical overstatements. The exhortation form holds out 
the goal of what is usually an unrealizable norm and the assertion form 
makes false claims about actually achieving that norm. Both forms are 
based on the implicit assumption that an appropriate standard for judging 
the real world of risk in which lawyers routinely operate is  an ideal risk 
free state. In adopting a point of view which implicitly presents the rele­
vant choice as that between the ideal and the actual, the zero risk tolerance 
notion succumbs to the nirvana fallacy often mentioned in the literature of 
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law and economics . 1 68 The nirvana fallacy consists of "comparing the im­
perfect to the ideal and concluding that the ideal dominates . " 1 69 Ideal 
states such as zero risk are typically either unattainable or too costly to 
attain and thus it is usually fallacious to compare the real with the ideal as 
if the ideal were an available option. 
A recent New York State Bar Opinion dealing with media rights pro­
vides examples of both forms of this fallacy . 1 70 An assistant district attor­
ney requested guidance concerning her sale of media rights allowing her 
character to be portrayed i n  television and movie presentations based on a 
highly publicized murder case she had prosecuted. The threat which al­
lowing such a sale presents to various facets of the prosecutor's effective 
and ethical functioning has been examined in Part LA., supra. In sum, the 
risk results from the combination of the prosecutor's financial "interest in 
seeing the case sensationalized" and her control of the "means of sensa­
tionalizing it" through her handling of the case . 1 7 1  The Opin ion demon­
strates awareness of this obvious threat by citing language from the Model 
Code's EC 5-4 warning that " [a] lawyer who gains an interest in  publica-
1 68 .  Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoilll, 1 2  J.L. & EcoN. I ,  I ( 1 969) .  
The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant 
choice as between an ideal norm and an existing "imperfect" institutional arrangement. This 
nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative instillltion approach in which the 
relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements. In practice, those who 
adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real and 
if  discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Users of the comparative 
institution approach attempt to assess which alternative real institutional arrangement seems 
best able to cope with the economic problem; practitioners of this approach may use an ideal 
norm to provide standards from which divergences are assessed for all practical alternatives 
of interest and select as efficient that alternative which seems most likely to minimize the 
divergence. 
!d. For examples of use of the concept of nirvana fallacy in critiques of various areas of legal doctrine, 
see the articles cited infra note 1 69. 
1 69 .  See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & David Partlett, An America 's Cup for Tort Reform? A ustralia 
and America Compared, 2 1  U. MICH. J.L. REF. 443, 452 ( 1 988 )  (stating that "[t]he real world of torts 
with all its warts cannot be compared with the idealized reformed world.") ;  Richard A. Epstein, Two 
Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73  GEO. L.J. 1 377, 1 377- 1 378 ( 1 985)  ("The right intellectual 
orientation is not to set the aspirations of the system too high. Trying to get the right result in all cases 
is noble, but it is also unattainable. It is another manifestation of the Nirvana fallacy, by which the 
defects in one proposed set of institutions are compared to an unrealizable ideal instead of to their 
feasible alternatives.") (quoting Demsetz, supra note 1 68) ;  Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporare Govern­
ance Movement, 35  VAND. L. REv.  1 259, 1 272 ( 1 982) (asserting that "it is a form of the nirvana 
fallacy to conclude that the structure of corporations or corporation law should be changed because 
existing insitutitonal arrangements are imperfect.") (quoting Demsetz, supra note 1 68 ) .  
1 70. New York State Bar Op .  606- 1 / 1 1 /90 ( 2 1 -89) .  
1 7 1 .  HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 1 .8 .50 1 ,  at  27 1 ("A lawyer holding media rights to  the story 
of the very case in which he is involved has an interest in seeing the case sensationalized. The lawyer 
also has the means of sensationalizing it, by his choice of tactics and by the recommendations he makes 
to the client .") . 
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tion rights relating to  the subject matter of employment may be tempted to 
compromise the interest of the client for the lawyer's own anticipated pecu­
niary gain ." 1 72 
The Opinion concludes that sale of media rights by the prosecutor is 
impermissible while the case is pending. Such a sale is permissible, how­
ever, once the representation has terminated. This delayed sale rule is con­
flict of i nterest doctrine's standard resolution of such media rights issues. 
The Model Code and Model Rules have provisions which parallel the re­
sult in  the Opinion, 1 73 and are cited in the Opinion as support for its adop­
tion of the delayed sale rule. 1 74 
A moment's reflection reveals that requiring the prosecutor to wait until 
after the representation is terminated to sell the rights does not eliminate 
the threat that her fi nancial i nterest in increasing the value of the media 
rights will compromise fulfil lment of her professional roles and obligations. 
The requirement simply converts the incentive from one of present finan­
cial gain to one of future fi nancial gain. Nonetheless, the Opinion states 
that " [a] fter the representation, the potential conflict with which the rule is 
concerned disappears," 1 75 suggesting that delaying the sale has eliminated 
the risk. This sort of zero risk claim is not an isolated phenomenon .  The 
Model Code's EC 5-4 states that media deals should be delayed until after 
"termination of all aspects of the matter" in order "to prevent . . .  poten­
tially differing interests ." 1 76 Similarly, a leading treatise in  legal ethics 
claims that the delay rule removes the temptation to be found in lawyer 
media deals . 1 77 
This same New York Bar Opinion demonstrates the exhortation version 
1 72. New York State Bar Op. 606- 1 / 1 1 /90 at 28 ( 2 1 -89). 
1 73 .  MODEL RULES Rule 1 .8(d); MODEL CODE DR 5- 1 04(B) cited with approval in New York 
State Bar Op. 606- 1 / 1 1 /90, at 27-28 (2 1 -89) .  
1 74. New York State Bar Op . 606- 1 / 1 1 /90 at 27-28 (2 1 -89).  
1 75.  !d. at 27. 
1 76. MODEL CODE EC 5-4 reads: 
I f, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive from his 
client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject matter of the. em­
ployment, he may be tempted io subordinate the interests of the client to his own anticipated 
pecuniary gain. For example/a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from his client televi­
sion, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with rep­
sect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that 
will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these 
potential/)' differing interests, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the 
termination of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his em­
ployment has previosly ended. 
(emphasis added) 
1 77 .  HAZARD & HoDES,  supra note 2, § 1 .8 .50 I ,  at 27 1 ("Both the Code and the Rules of Profes­
sional Conduct remove the temptation by prohibiting the arrangement al together, at least until the 
representation is terminated.") (emphasis added) .  
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of the zero risk fal lacy. After i ndicating that the prosecutor may sell her 
media rights after the representation is terminated, the Opinion adds some 
cautionary notes. First, it  warns against the lawyer being actual ly  influ­
enced in her handl ing of the case, a statement reflecting real ization of the 
continuing existence of the very risk which the portion of the Opinion cited 
in the previous paragraph claimed would disappear. 1 78 The Opinion then 
adds a second caution . "Counsel must avoid even the temptation to take a 
course of action that might enhance the value of the Ia wyer's publication or 
media rights at the risk of i mpeding the client's cause. " 1 79 Obviously, 
though, the very course of conduct which the Opinion approves, sale of the 
media rights after termination of the representation, creates the very temp­
tation which the lawyer is advised to avoid . 1 80 
Avoidance of ail risk of impairment for lawyers is an unattainable goal . 
A lawyer's fees,  for example, no matter what form they take are a source 
of i ncentives which threaten to impair a lawyer's functioning. These incen­
tives cannot be eliminated without eliminating compensation for Ia wyers, 
an unlikely prospect. S imilarly, a lawyer's political views and his represen­
tation of other clients are sources of incentives which threaten impairment 
and cannot practic.aily be eliminated. 
However, certain specific sources of risk could be eliminated by the 
adoption of rules absolutely banning particular types of attorney conduct. 
Model Rule 1 .8 (c) ,  for example, provides an instance of this sort of ap­
proach with its absolute ban on a lawyer's preparing a legal instrument 
which gives the lawyer or certain relatives any substantial gift from the 
client. 1 8 1 Usuaily, though, conflict of i nterest doctrine chooses not to elimi­
nate the risk entirely. For example, it would be possible to eliminate the 
threat posed by lawyers seil ing media rights concerning their cases by ab­
solutely banning any such sales. Such an absolute ban would be costly and 
conflict of interest doctrine in fact does not adopt such an approach.  
1 78 .  New York State Bar  Op .  606- l / l l /90 a t  28 (2 1 -89).  
1 79 .  !d. (emphasis added ) .  
I SO. For other examples of expression of the exhortation form of the zero risk fallacy, see Estates 
Theatres, Inc .  v. Columbia Pictures I ndus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 99 (S.D.N .Y.  1 972) ("A lawyer 
should not be permitted to put himself in a position where, even unconsciously he will be tempted to 
'soft pedal' his zeal in furthering the interests of one client in order to avoid an obvious clash with those 
of another.") ;  RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 273 (2d ed . 1 970) ("If  there is the slightest doubt as 
to whether or not the acceptance of professional employment will involve a conflict of interest between 
two clients or with a former client, or a conflict between the interests of any client and that of the 
attorney, or may require the use of information obtained through service of another client, the employ­
ment should be refused.") .  
1 8 1 .  MODEL RULE l .S (c) states: 
A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer 
as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamen­
tary gift, except where the client is related to the donee. 
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Rather, the existing delayed sale rule seems to  represent an implicit judg­
ment that delay reduces the risk such media deals present to an acceptable 
level. Or perhaps it simply looks better and thus the delayed sale rule 
might be explained as consistent with an appearance approach . In either 
case, it  is clear that the delayed sale rule does not eliminate all risk arising 
from such deals and thus the actual rule contradicts both the exhortation 
and the assertion forms of the zero risk fallacy. 
Expression of the zero risk fallacy does conflict of interest doctrine a 
disservice. Conflicts issues and their resolution would be more understanda­
ble if we were candid about the fact that a certai n  amount of risk of im­
pairment is tolerable, either because we have no practical alternative or 
because we think that there are sufficient reasons justifying the risk. Fail­
ure to candidly admit that we allow such risk and adopting instead the 
verbal posture that lawyers must entirely avoid risk is harmful in two ways . 
One, it lends the conflicts rules an air of pontification and obvious contra­
diction between what they say and what they do. Second, failure to openly 
address the risk questions fails to provide lawyers or the bodies enforcing 
the conflicts rules with guidance about the real questions of acceptability of 
risk which must be and in fact are resolved every day by lawyers, courts, 
and discipl inary boards in the conflicts area . 
b. Acceptance of Substantial Risk 
In the previous section, we saw that conflict of i nterest doctrine, despite 
its articulation at times of a preference for avoidance of all risk, through its 
rules actually fi nds certain  risks acceptable, such as those posed by delayed 
media rights sales. Sometimes it finds acceptable situations posing substan­
tial risk of i mpairment of a lawyer's functioning. Evans v. Jeff D., 1 82 a rela­
tively recent Supreme Court case widely cited and excerpted in profes­
sional responsibility texts as an example of treatment of attorney-cl ient 
conflict of interest, 1 83 provides a prime example of such an attitude. 
The issue in Evans was the propriety in civil rights cases of defense set­
tlement offers conditioned on waiver of payment of the plaintiff's attorney's 
fees by the defendant. ,�cceptance of such a conditional offer leaves the 
1 8 2. 475 u .s.  7 1 7  ( 1 986) .  
1 83 .  The Evans case is excerpted at length in GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 18 ,  at 740-57; GEOF­
FREY HAZARD & SUSAN KONIAK. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 536-56 ( 1 990); JOH'i f. 
SLTTO:\ & JOHN S. DZI ENKOWSKI. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 408- 1 5  ( 1 989) .  The 
Evans case is summarized in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA. PROBLEMS AND MATERI­
ALS 0:\ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 48 1 -82  (5th ed. 1 99 1 )  and in MORTIMER SCHWARTZ & RICH­
ARD WY!liCK, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 323 (2d ed. 1 988) .  The fact pattern of Evans has been used 
as the basis for a problem in KAUFMAN, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 463, and the conflict of interest dimensions 
of Evam are discussed in  this work at 477. 
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plaintiff's lawyer uncompensated for the time i nvested in the case, which 
may be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars . 1 84 Obviously, such offers 
create a significant fi nancial incentive for the plaintiff's  lawyer to recom­
mend against the settlement, even if the settlement is in  his client's best 
interest. Take, for example, the lawyers in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 1 85 a 
civil rights case decided by the Supreme Court during the same term as 
Evans. I n  Rivera, the Court approved an award by the trial court to the 
lawyers of $245 ,456 .25  for nearly 2,000 hours of time the plaintiff's attor­
neys expended on the case . 1 86 In such a case, a conditional settlement offer 
of the sort approved in Evans would have faced the plaintiff's lawyers with 
the prospect of losing over $245 ,000, representing time already i nvested, if 
they advised their cl ient to settle .  The risk accordingly is great that the 
lawyer will react, as the lawyers did initially i n  the Evans case, 1 87 by ignor­
ing his client's interest and rejecting out of hand any settlement offer con­
ditioned on such a waiver. In short, there is substantial r isk of impairment 
of the lawyer's obligation to provide advice untainted by his own financial 
self-interest concerning what is i n  his client's best interest . 1 88 
A number of jurisdictions prior to Evans prohibited such settlement of­
fers . 1 89 The Supreme Court i n  Evans, however, i nterpreted the civil rights 
statute in question as not prohibiting such settlement offers . The primary 
rationale for the Court's ruling was the public policy of encouraging  the 
settlement of civil rights cases by providing the defense with a significant 
financial incentive to settle in  order to avoid payment of the large attor-
1 84. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U .S. 561 ( 1 986) (approving award of $245,456.25 in 
attorney's fees). 
1 85. !d. 
1 86. !d. at 565, 58 1 .  
1 87 .  Evans, 475 U.S.  at 722 (noting that intially the waiver of attorney's fees sought by the defend­
ant "was unacceptable to the Idaho Legal Aid Society, which had instructed Johnson to reject any 
settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees, but Johnson ultimately determined that his ethical 
obligation to his clients mandated acceptance of the proposal .") .  
1 88 .  Matthew G .  Bertani, Comment, Attorney Fees: Simultaneous Negotiation and the Condition­
ing of Settlement Of ers on the Merits Upon Waiver of Statutory Attorney 's Fees: An Ethical and 
Policy Analysis, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 5 1 7, 527 ( 1 987) (noting that courts have found "the potential con­
flict of interest between plaintiffs and their counsel [created by simultaneous negotiations] to be so 
acute that bifurcated negotiations [are] necessary where statutory attorney's fees [are] available .") ;  
Peter H .  Woodin, Note, Fee Waivers and Civil Rights Settlement Offers: State Ethics Prohibitions 
After Evans v. Jejj' D., 87 COLUM. L. REV . 1 2 1 4, 1 2 1 6  ( 1 987)  (arguing that " [a] defendant's demand 
for a fee waiver during settlement negotiations can create a conflict of interest between the civil rights 
plaintiff and attorney that can harm the plaintiff's interests .") ;  Comment, The Supreme Court, 1985 
Term-Leading Cases, 1 00 HARV. L. REv.  264 ( 1 986) (asserting that the Court in Evans "failed to 
consider the practical effect of its holding: that attorneys will be tempted as a matter of course to 
violate their ethical obligations .") .  
1 89. See. e.g., District of Columbia Bar, Op. 1 47 ( 1 985) ;  Grievance Commission on Board of Over­
seers of the Bar of Maine, Advisory Op. No. 1 7  ( 1 983) .  
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ney's fees which can accrue in such cases . 1 90 The case may be criticized on 
a number of grounds . 1 9 1  Of primary i nterest for the purposes of this article, 
however, is the attitude it displays about the appropriate response to incen­
tives which create risk of attorney impairment. 
One of the arguments advanced in Evans against the propriety of condi­
tional settlement offers was one based on concern for attorney conflict of 
interest. The Evans Court responded to the argument that the civil rights 
statute in  question should be interpreted so as not to put the plaintiff's 
lawyer in a conflict of interest si tuation as follows: 
Although respondents contend that Johnson, as counsel for the class, 
was faced with an "ethical dilemma" when petitioners offered him relief 
greater than that which he could reasonably have expected to obtain for 
his clients at trial (if only he would stipulate to a waiver of the statutory 
fee award), and although we recognize Johnson's conflicting interest be­
tween pursuing relief for the class and a fee for the Idaho Legal Aid Soci­
ety, we do not believe that the "dilemma" was an "ethical" one in the 
sense that Johnson had to choose between conflicting duties under the pre­
vailing norms of professional conduct. Plainly, Johnson had no ethical ob­
ligation to seek a statutory fee award. His ethical duty was to serve his 
clients loyally and competently. Since the proposal to settle the merits was 
more favorable than the probable outcome of the trial, Johnson's decision 
to recommend acceptance was consistent with the highest standards of our 
profession. The District Court, therefore, correctly concluded that ap­
proval of the settlement involved no breach of ethics in this case. 1 92 
This passage expresses the attitude that situations which pose high risk 
of attorney impairment if they arise from the attorney's financial interests 
are simply not an ethical concern. The Court seems to be saying that the 
plaintiff's lawyer has a clear ethical obligation not to allow his  advice to be 
tainted by his own financial self interest and that we can count on lawyers 
1 90. Emns, 475 U .S. at  732-38. The Court emphasized that "a general proscription against negoti­
ated waiver of attorney's fees in exchange for a settlement on the merits would itself impede vindication 
of civil rights, at least in some cases, by reducing the attractiveness of settlement." !d. at 732. 
1 9 1 .  One criticism is that such waivers, by making civil rights cases less financially attractive to 
potential plaintiff's lawyers, will rri�ke i t  more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to obtain counsel. See, 
e.g., Evans, 475 U.S. 754-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (predicting that "allowing defendants in civil 
rights cases to condition settlement of the merits on a waiver of statutory attorney's fees will diminish 
lawyers' expectations of receiving fees and decrease the willingness of lawyers to accept civil rights 
cases."); Margaret A.  de Lisser, Comment, Giving Substance to the Bad Faith Exception of Evans v. 
1�/I D.: A Reconciliations of Evans with the Civil Rights Allonzey's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 1 36 U. 
PA. L. REv. 553, 567 ( 1 987 )  (arguing that "Evans creates a structure favoring the individual client at 
the expense of the attorney, and ultimately at the expense of future civil rights litigants, who, because 
of the inadequate fee generating al ternatives, depend on the Fees Act's uniform and consistent opera­
tion to attract counsel to represent them."). 
1 92 .  Evans, 475 U .S. at 727-28 (footnotes omitted). 
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to  follow their ethical obligation no matter how great an incentive threat­
ens to impair that obligation.  
A similar attitude seems apparent i n  the Court's discussion of its deci­
sion's impact on promoting settlement. Obviously, settlement requires the 
agreement of both sides in  litigation . But the Court examined only the in­
centives which conditional settlement offers create for defendants. Unex­
amined was the disincentive to settle created by such settlement offers for 
plaintiffs' lawyers. This may simply have been a failure to think the prob­
lem through. Or it may reflect the same implicit attitude expressed in the 
previous paragraph, that we can simply trust lawyers to resist such finan­
cial incentives no matter how substantial they may be. 
The attitude toward how much risk of impairment a lawyer should be 
permitted to encounter expressed by Evans v. Jeff D. is precisely the oppo­
site of that found in the zero risk fallacy. The zero risk fallacy tells us that 
lawyers should avoid situations which pose any risk. The attitude found in 
Evans indicates that situations which pose even very high risk are accept­
able because we can count on lawyers s imply to resist the incentives giving 
rise to the risk. Where one expresses dread of encounters between lawyers 
and risk, the other expresses bravado at such encounters . 
c. Other S ignals About Acceptable Risk Levels 
Between the extremes i llustrated in the previous sections, one fi nds all 
sorts of signals about how much risk is acceptable. Some authorities speak 
in terms of prohibiting possible impairment. A treatise defines conflict of 
i nterest as anything which "might interfere" with the lawyer's judgment. 193 
The Model Rules prohibit situations in  which the representation "may be 
materially limited ." 1 94 Variations on this "possibility" approach include 
Model Code DR 5- l 0 1  (A)'s i nclusion of a reasonableness requirement in 
the phrase "reasonably may be affected ." 1 95 Another variation is the prohi­
bition of the "mere possibility" of impairment . 1 96 Other authorities seem to 
require a higher level of risk by using terms which suggest probable rather 
than possible impairment. The Model Code DR's 5- 1 0 5 (A) and (B) pro­
hibit situations in  which the lawyer's judgment is "likely" to be affected . 1 97 
Still other authorities seem to require something greater .  The Restatement, 
for example, defines conflict of interest as a "substantial risk" of impair-
1 93. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at § 4.0 1 ,  4-2. 
1 94. MODEL RULES Rule 1 .7 .  
1 95. MODEL CODE DR 5- l O l (A). 
1 96. In re Lantz, 442 N .E.2d 989, 990 ( Ind. 1 982) (ordering reprimand of a state prosecutor who 
represented both the state in a criminal case and the named defendant in a separate civil action). 
1 97. MoDEL CoDE DR 5- 1 05(A)-(B). 
1 992]  RETHI N K I NG CONFLICT OF I NTEREST 869 
ment . 1n  I n  sum,  current doctrine gives a wide range of inconsistent 
messages about what likelihood of attorney impairment is tolerable, rang­
ing from none, to possible, to probable, to substantial . 
2. What Role Should Justifiability of the Risk Play? 
What role should justifications for taking risk play in defining acceptable 
risk levels? In many areas of the law utilizing risk analysis, the standard 
for determining acceptable risk is determined by using a cost-benefit analy­
sis which balances the magnitude of risk in  terms of the gravity and 
probability of harm against the utility of the conduct which creates the 
risk. 1 99 The Model Penal Code provides an i l lustration of this sort of stan­
dard. Recklessness under the Model Penal Code requires that the risk be 
both "substantial" and "unjustifiable ."200 Thus, a doctor who performs an 
operation which entails a very high degree of risk of death to a patient will 
not be reckless under the Model Penal Code regardless of the degree of 
risk if  the operation is the only means of saving the patient's l ife.2°1 I n  
other words, the social util ity o f  using the only means to save the patient's 
l ife justifies what would otherwise be an unacceptably high level of risk. 
How does this idea of the justifiability of risk figure into attorney con flict 
of interest analysis?  Notions of justifiability pervade cases, opinions and 
commentary about attorney conflict of i nterest. The Model Code's EC 5-7 
in discussing the propriety of contingent fees states that although a contin­
gent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest in  the outcome of 
the litigation, the arrangement is permissible because "it may be the only 
means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his 
choice. "202 I n  other words, the Mode! Code expresses the idea that the de-
1 98 .  RESTATEMENT § 20 I .  
1 99 .  See, e.g., W .  PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 1 ,  a t  1 7 1  
(5th ed. 1 984) (enunciating the balancing of probability and gravity of any risk against the "utility of 
the type of conduct in question.") ;  W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.4, at 6 1 9  (2d ed. 
1 986) (stating that not only mus.t the risk be substantial, but that "it must also under the circum­
stances be unjustifiable for [the individual] to take the risk," the "social utility" of the conduct must be 
examined as wel l ) .  
200. MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 2.[;12{2){ c)  { 1 962) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a material 
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the mate­
rial element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, 
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would 
observe in the actor's situation."). 
20 1 .  MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02 cmt. ("The risk of which the actor is aware must of course be 
substantial in order for the recklessness judgment to be made. The risk must also be unjustifiable. Even 
substantial risks, it is clear, may be created without recklessness when the actor is seeking to serve a 
proper purpose, as when a surgeon performs an operation that he knows is very l ikely to be fatal, but 
reasonably thinks to be necessary because the patient has no other, safer chance."). 
202. MODEL CODE EC 5-7. 
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gree of  risk presented by  contingent fees i s  acceptable once the  justifiabi lity 
factors of access to counsel and choice of counsel are entered into the equa­
tion . In the area of conflicts dealing with simultaneous representation of 
two clients, the justifications of saving each client time and money a ppear 
repeatedly in cases, opinions and commentary. In the area of joint repre­
sentation in a litigated case, the justification of maintaining a unified front 
features prominently. Justice Frankfurter's words are frequently quoted to 
express this justification for allowing joint representation: "a common de­
fense . . .  gives strength against a common attack."203 
The conflicts problem considered above i n  Part I I I .A.2 .  concerning  re­
assignment of an associate on a case because the religious background of 
the associate is likely to arouse the prejudice of the jury presents a conflict 
of interest situation in which the idea of justifiability of risk may prove 
crit ical . Previously, we asked whether or not catering to the prejudice of 
the jury to increase the client's chance of winning is  within the sphere of 
obl igations owed by the law firm to the client and if so whether it  was one 
which was protected by the conflict of i nterest rules. If one assumes for 
purposes of argument an affirmative answer to both of those questions ,  and 
we assume that the jury pool is such that there is a substantial risk of 
prejudice against the associate, then the key question becomes one of 
justifiability. 
The associate to be removed from the case might argue a number of 
factors as potential justifications for taking this r isk. First, the associate 
might argue her own career i nterest in  the experience to be provided by 
handling the case. The experience may provide her with i ncreased m arket­
ability and mobility as well as increase her value to the firm and thus in­
crease her chances for making partner. She may also assert an  interest in  
being treated on an ethnically neutral basis in  terms of being assigned 
work. The conflicts question then turns on whether attorney conflict of in­
terest rules include within the concept of justifiability either the associate's 
economic and career interests or the i nterest in being treated on an ethni­
cally neutral basis .  I f  so,  then how much weight do we give them in offset­
ting the risk of impairment of the attorney's courtroom effectiveness in act­
ing for the client? 
The issue of justifi abil ity breaks down into subsidiary questions .  Should 
justifiability play a role at all? If so, how do we define what factors should 
be incorporated in the idea of justifiability? Should we l imit it to factors 
which provide benefit to the client, such as saving time or money or pre­
serving a unified front? Should it also i nclude factors which provide benefit 
to attorneys, such as the attorney being treated in an ethnically or racially 
203. Glasser v. United States, 3 1 5  U .S. 60, 92 ( 1 942) ( Frankfurter, J . ,  dissenting). 
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non-discriminatory way? Should i t  include factors which benefit society or 
the admin istration of justice generally, like promoting settlement of cases 
and easing crowded dockets? Once we decide these questions, then we must 
confront the final question of how much weight to give these factors in 
offsetting magnitude of risk. 
There is virtually no guidance on any of these questions in the Model 
Code or Model Rules. Neither of these even mentions the idea of j ustifia­
bility in their rule formulations, much less do they provide any guidance on 
any of the other questions mentioned above. Cases frequently utilize j ustifi­
ability factors, but a lmost no explicit discussion is given to the notion of 
justifiability, how it i s  defined, or how much weight it is to be given in the 
final determination of the acceptability of the risk presented. 
C. WHO DECIDES? 
Part I I I  so far has advanced a series of risk analysis questions having to 
do with defining acceptable levels of risk of impairment of  an attorney's 
functioning. The next question we need to turn to is who gets to choose the 
answers to the previous questions. Who sets the level of acceptable risk? 
The client? The i ndividual lawyer? The organized bar? The j udge if the 
conflict of interest question arises i n  a litigated case? 
The issue of the proper balance of authority and responsibility between 
lawyer and client has received considerable attention among academic 
commentators.204 One of the points which present doctrine is clear about is 
that it  does grant the client a degree of decisionmaking authority and re­
sponsibi lity regarding conflict of interest .  One of the prominent features of 
modern conflicts doctrine is the disclosure and consent formula .205 Under 
this formula,  the lawyer is obligated to disclose to the client the existence 
of certain  incentives which threaten impairment and after such disclosure 
the lawyer may proceed with the representation if the client consents. The 
existence of this disclosure and consent formula m ight be described as re­
flecting a "market model" of professional regulation in which the individ­
ual client as a consumer of legal services exercises her own preference for 
,� 
204. See, e.g., GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 1 8, at 4 1 5-430; WOLFRAM, supra note I I , at  1 54-
1 59; D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN CHARGE? ( 1 974); Marcy Strauss ,Toward a Re­
vised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for A utonomy, 65 N .C.L. REv. 3 1 5  
( 1 987);  David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1 98 1  Wis. L. REV. 454; Mark Spiegel, 
Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consell/ and the Legal Profession, 1 28 U.  PA. L. REv. 
41 ( 1 979); Susan R.  Martyn, Informed Consell/ in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307 
( 1 980); Judith L. Maute, A llocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of Profes­
sional Conduct, 1 7  U.C. DAVIS L. REv., 1 049 ( 1 984). 
205. See, e.g.,  MODEL CODE DR 5- I O l (A), DR 5- l 05(C); MoDEL RULES Rule l .7(a)(2), (b)(2); 
WoLFRAM, supra note I I , at 3 37-349. 
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risk.206 I n  short, this formula gives the client some choice about the ques­
tions of both magnitude and justifiability of the risk she is will ing to have 
her lawyer encounter. 
The range of choice which a client may exercise under the disclosure and 
consent formula is, however, limited . At a certain point under current doc­
trine, one reaches a zone of "nonconsenta ble" conflicts.2°7 In this zone, the 
rules override client choice about risk preference. The Model Code uses an 
"obviously adequate" test to define the zone  of nonconsentable conflicts.208 
The Model Rules use a "reasonable belief' test to define this zone . 209 
Although the basic notions that the client has a role i n  making choices 
about conflict quest ions and that the range of client choice about these 
questions is circumscribed by the notion of nonconsentable conflicts are 
well established, the line between "consentable" and "nonconsentable" con­
flicts is murky. Neither the "obvious adequacy" nor the "reasonable belief' 
tests provide much guidance on  where to draw the boundary of client au­
tonomy in the area of conflict of interest . 2 1 0  
Another area which is unclear is precisely what is required by disclosure 
and consent. One might well have doubts, for example, about both the 
quality and quantity of information available to the client in making her 
choice about risk. These doubts seem particularly well founded in the con­
flicts area where the lawyer is the one who supplies the information to the 
client. The lawyer has an economic incentive not to fully disclose all the 
information which might dissuade the client from consenting to the conflict 
so that he can keep the client's business in order to increase his own in­
come. Conflicts doctrine provides l ittle guidance on the question of how 
much information must be disclosed. 
One might argue that a market or consumer sovereignty model over­
states the ability of the client to use the information available to her. This 
argument focuses on the client's lack of expertise rather than lack of raw 
information . Particularly when the choice involves an area such as profes­
sional . services like law or medicine, this argument would assert that the 
consumer simply lacks the expertise to understand and choose between the 
risks associated with various courses of action . The very existence of the 
disclosure and consent formula represents at least a partial rejection of this 
206. See John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CoRNELL L. REV. 1 02 1  ( 1 982) 
(describing a market model of professional reform which looks to private contract and market mecha­
nisms rather than outside regulation to prevent lawyer abuses) .  
207 . See WOLFRAM, supra note I I , at  337-343. 
208. See MoDEL CODE DR 5-l OS( C), WoLFRAM, supra note 1 1 , at 339-343. 
209. See MODEL RULES Rule l .7(a)( l ) , (b) ( l ) ; WOLFRAM, supra note I I , at 339-343. 
2 1 0. For discussion of the ambiguities and inadequacies of the Model Code 's "obviously adequate" 
and the Model Rules' "reasonable belief' provisions, see WoLFRAM, supra note I I ,  at 3 4 1 ;  Moore, 
supra note 5 ,  at 220-230. 
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argument. But the  argument about lack of  expertise raises a number of  
problems. For example, may or must the lawyer in making disclosure also 
give the cl ient advice on the wisdom of consenting? When is the advice of 
an independent lawyer on the question of consenting to a conflict required, 
if ever? Present doctrine leaves these questions largely unaddressed.2 1 1 
Another argument which might be raised against a market or consumer 
sovereignty model is that even if the client has adequate information and 
expertise to make a decision about risk of attorney impairment, the quality 
of that choice is frequently impaired because of lack of alternatives. For 
example, when an individual employee of a company consents to joint rep­
resentation of the individual employee and the company by lawyers paid 
for by the company, is this choice a truly voluntary one when she lacks the 
resources to pay for her own lawyer? 
Other factors may also undermine the quality of voluntariness underly­
ing the consent. If the conflict comes up not at the outset of the representa­
tion, but during the representation, the fact that the client has already in­
vested time and money in  the lawyer's services may undermine the client's 
freedom of choice. Post-retainer fee agreements between lawyers and cli­
ents raise a similar problem and courts review such fee agreements under a 
different and more demanding standard than that applied to fee agree­
ments negotiated at the outset of the relationship.2 1 2  Whether there should 
be a similar distinction between client consent regarding conflict of interest 
obtained at the outset of the representation as opposed to during the repre­
sentation is an i nteresting and unresolved question .  
A nother interesting and important question unanswered by current doc­
trine is whether the same boundary for nonconsentable conflicts should be 
set for all clients. One could argue, for example, for more relaxed or even 
no l imits on the range of choice regarding risk preference for clients who 
have considerable abil ity to assess and monitor risk, such as a corporate 
cl ient with in house counsel . We might recognize a "sophisticated client" 
exception to the normal rules about nonconsentable confl icts .21 3 Similarly, 
one could also argue for more stringent l imits on the range of choice re­
garding risk preference for clients whose abi l ities to monitor and assess risk 
·"' 
2 1 1 .  The Model Rules Rule 1 .8(a){2) does provide some guidance on the question of independent 
advice by requiring that the client be given "a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent 
counsel" before entering into a business transaction with his lawyer. 
2 1 2. See GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 1 8 , at  1 1 2 ("When the fee agreement is reached after the 
attorney-client relationship is formed, courts are especially strict in  reviewing i t  for fairness . . .  After 
retainer, the client is presumed to be less free to go elsewhere and the attorney is assumed to be in a 
significantly superior bargaining position ."). 
2 1 3 . An analogous "sophisticated investor" notion is mentioned i n  the field of securities law. See, 
e.g., Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcemelll of Arbitration Agreements, 7 1  
M I :\�. L REV 393 ,  427-3 1 ( 1 987) .  
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are questionable, such as  criminal defendants . 2 1 4  
So far we have referred to two possible answers to the question about 
who sets the level of acceptable risk in situations which threaten attorney 
impairment, the client or the organized bar through its rules about noncon­
sentable conflicts. Another source of ambiguity in  conflicts doctrine is its 
suggestion of other possible answers to this question of who decides about 
such risks. For example, in Holloway v. Arkansas, 2 1 5  the United States 
Supreme Court stated that an "attorney representing two defendants in  a 
criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to deter­
mine when a conflict of i nterest exists or wil l  probably develop i n  the 
course of a trial."2 1 6  Similarly, the Advisory Committee notes to  Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 state that " [a]voiding a conflict-of-interest 
situation is in the first instance a responsibility of the attorney ."2 1 7  These 
passages may simply suggest that the i ndividual lawyer has the responsibil­
ity to monitor and enforce the bar's rules about disclosures and consent and 
nonconsentable conflicts. But these passages also seem to suggest some 
measure of authority, perhaps even discretion , on the part of the attorney 
about determining the l ine between consentable and nonconsentable con­
flicts because of the attorney's unique vantage point and familiarity with 
the facts of the particular case. 
A different message about who gets to decide the essential risk prefer­
ence questions is sent by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 and recent 
Supreme Court authority concerning joint representation in criminal cases . 
Both Rule 44(c) and Wheat v. United States21 8  grant the trial judge con­
siderable authority to override a criminal defendant's choice about joint 
representation. The boundary l ine, though, between the trial judge's sphere 
of authority and the defendant's sphere of autonomy concerning the joint 
representation is blurred. Rule 44(c) , for example, simply provides that the 
"the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each 
defendant's right to counsel ."2 1 9  The Wheat case applies a discretionary 
standard of review to the trial judge's decision whether to override a crimi­
nal defendant's choice about joint representation220 but provides virtually 
2 1 4. See Moore, supra note 5 (arguing for an absolute ban on post-indictment joint representation of 
criminal defendants because of problems relating to capacity to consent) . 
2 1 5 . 435 U.S. 475 ( 1 978) .  
2 1 6 . !d. at 485 (quoting State v. Davis, 5 1 4  P.2d 1 025, 1 027 (Ariz. 1 973)) .  
2 1 7 . FED. R. CRIM .  P. 44 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules re :  1 979 Amendment. 
2 1 8 . 486 U.S. 1 53 ( 1 988) .  
2 1 9 . FED. R. CRIM.  P .  44(c). 
220. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 1 63 ("we think the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in 
refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be 
demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which 
may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses"). 
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no  guidance on how this discretion i s  to  be  exercised. 
In short, there are many unanswered questions under current doctrine 
relating to the main question of allocat ion of decisionmaking authority with 
respect to setting acceptable risk levels . 
I V. REMAINING DIFFICULTIES 
The suggestions set forth in this article are intended as first steps toward 
improving the clarity and sophistication of attorney conflict of interest doc­
trine. Developing a clear vocabulary, distinguishing risk of impairment, re­
sulting impairment, and appearance of impairment, and breaking down 
risk analysis into components such as magnitude and justifiability will all 
help in understanding the basic issues. Once this foundation is  in place, 
many difficulties remain . 
A. ACHIEVING CONSENSUS 
The thrust of this article is that we lack clear concepts and terminology 
language for dealing with attorney conflict of i nterest . One explanation for 
the present ambiguities of conflict of interest doctrine is that the problem is 
simply one of language. Once lawyers gain adequate conceptual and termi­
nological means for discussing and formulating doctrine, they will be able 
to achieve consensus on how to answer questions about the role of risk, 
about defining acceptable risk levels, and about who gets to decide these 
questions . One might call this the "Babel" thesis, conjuring up the image 
of  a legal profession which is plagued by a s imple inability to 
communicate. 
Another possible explanation is that the present conceptual and termino­
logical confusion, rather than being simply a problem of language, is the 
product of a more fundamental lack of professional consensus about the 
standards which should govern the questions addressed in Parts II  and III .  
One may view the doctrinal confusion as reflecting the fact that lawyers 
have widely differing feelings on questions such as the magnitude of ac­
ceptable risk, the justifiability factors which should be included in setting 
acceptable risk levels;-1' and who should get to make the decisions about 
these questions.221 "The profession's i nability to reach consensus on the pro-
22 1 .  See Moore, supra note 5, at 225 ("The profession's inability to reach consensus on the propriety 
of even the most common instances of multiple representation also suggests serious disagreement re­
garding the significance of the policy considerations thought to underlie the current A BA Code conflict 
of interest rule.") ( footonotes ommitted); Professor Hazard suggests a similar possible explanation for 
the difficulties which have plagued efforts to arrive at ethical standards for lawyers in negotiation. 
The fundamental difficulty appears to stem from the lack of a firm professional consensus 
regarding the standard of openness that should govern lawyers' dealings with others and the 
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priety of even the most common instances of multiple representation "222 is 
an index of a lack of consensus on the proper resolution of conflict of  inter­
est questions. The variation from state to state in ethics codes is an i ndex of 
a lack of consensus regarding ethical standards for lawyers generally.223 
Such disagreements may be exacerbated with the increasing demographic 
diversity of the legal profession. 224 Lack of consensus a mong lawyers may 
be indicative of lack of consensus among society as a whole.225 Such a lack 
of concensus would cause obvious difficulties in formulating the answers to 
the questions set forth in this article. 
B.  VAGUENESS IN THE DEFINITION OF ATTORNEY ROLES AND OBLI G ATIONS 
Part l l l .A. ,  supra, addressed the issue of providing a clear focal point for 
analyzing risk to an attorney's various roles and obligations. One of the 
problems described in  that Part is  that conflict of interest doctrine does not 
clearly describe which roles and obligations are the concern of conflict of 
interest doctrine. A second problem is that it  is difficult to measure the 
possibility of impairment unless we have a fairly clear idea of the defini­
tions of those roles and obligations, yet many of the roles and obligations 
lack of settled and homogeneous standards of technique in  the practice of law. This lack of 
consensus indicates that lawyers, at least nationally, do not share a common conception of 
fairness in  the process of negotiation. The lack of this consensus means that lawyers lack the 
language to express norms of fairness in  negotiation and the institutional means to give effect 
to these norms. 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing 
Parties, 33 S.C. L. REv.  1 8 1 ,  1 90- 1 93 ( 1 98 1 )  (discussing the rejection of the Kutak Commission's 1.980 
proposal of an ethical rule of fairness in negotiations which encompassed a duty to disclose material 
facts). 
222. Moore, supra note 5 ,  at  225. 
223. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 1 65 ,  at vii-viii ("More than 35 jurisdictions have now adopted 
the Model Rules or significant provisions from them in some form, and there are notable variations 
among the jurisdictions, especially with respect to such crucial matters as conflicts and confidential­
ity . .  .These state variations graphically i llustrate the disagreements over how lawyers should conduct 
themselves."). 
224. For discussion of demographic developments in the legal profession, see Richard L. Abel, The 
Transformation of the American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SoCIETY REv .  7 ( 1 986) (describing 
divisions of race, gender, age, class and types of practice which make professional consensus increas­
ingly problematic); Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1 980's: A Profession in Transition, 
20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1 9  ( I  986);  Terence C. Halliday, Six Score Years and Ten: Demographic Tran­
sition in American Legal Profesion, /850-1 980, 20 LAW & Soc'v REv .  53 ( 1 986).  
225. See supra note 22 1 .  Professor Hazard follows his comments quoted in footnote 22 1 ,  supra, with 
the observation that the disagreement among lawyers about standards of fairness in negotiation is not 
difficult to understand when viewed against a larger social backdrop. "Lawyers standards of fairness 
are necessarily derived from those of society as a whole, and subcultural variations are enormous . . .  
Against this kaleidoscopic background, i t  is difficult to specify a single standard that governs the parties 
and thus a correlative standard that should govern their legal representatives." Hazard, supra note 22 1 ,  
at 1 93 .  
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which provide the focal point for conflicts analys is are themselves poorly 
defined .  
This problem cannot be  cured by reformulating conflict of interest doc­
trine. Clearer formulation of the rules defining the lawyer's roles and obli­
gations apart from the conflict of interest rules is needed to mend this 
problem . In short, because conflict of i nterest doctrine must incorporate by 
reference other rules which define attorney roles and obligations, the con­
flict rules are affected by whatever ambiguity those rules contain .  Conse­
quently, conflict of interest doctrine will continue to struggle with these 
vague definitions even if it does clearly state its own concerns. 
C. ACHIEVING CLEAR EXPRESSION 
Part I Y.A. ,  supra, mentioned the possible problems which might be en­
countered in achieving consensus on the answers to the questions posed i n  
Parts I I  and I I I ,  such as setting the parameters of acceptable risk and cli­
ent decision making authority in  the conflicts area . Even if consensus can 
be achieved, it will nonetheless be difficult clearly to express the answers to 
many of these questions. For example, it  will be difficult verbally to express 
the l ine between acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk of i mpairment, 
the parameters of justifiabil ity and the proper sphere of client autonomy in  
deciding about acceptable risk. 
V .  CONC LUSIO N  
Threats of impairment of an attorney's functioning may arise from an 
almost l imitless number of sources. Such threats are an inevitable and ever 
present part of the work lives of lawyers. The hard questions which lie at 
the heart of the subject of attorney conflict of interest concern how to re­
spond to these threats, how to distinguish risks which are acceptable from 
those which are unacceptable. I f  attorney conflict of interest doctrine is to 
provide guidance to lawyers in  encountering such risk situations and to 
courts and disciplinary committees applying conflict of interest standards to 
lawyers, it must articulate and answer these essential questions. This arti­
cle has sought to demo9strate the need for rethinking attorney conflict of 
interest doctrine so that it focuses unambiguously on these central ques­
tions. It has a lso sought to provide the first steps toward a clearer, more 
sophisticated treatment of attorney conflict of interest doctrine. 
